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ARTICLES
KEEPING FAITH: FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN
PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS
Robert G. Natelson*
INTRODUCTION
The most significant challenge to American real property law
in this century has been the rise of the residential property owners
association. Although such associations were comparative rarities
only twenty-five years ago, they now regulate the ownership rights
of millions of home owners. Indeed, it has been projected that
within fifteen years one out of every two Americans will be subject
to an association regime.1
Given the magnitude of this development, the amount of seri-
ous scholarship produced in the area has been surprisingly small,
and its quality has not always been good.' Thus the courts and
* A.B., 1970, Lafayette College; J.D., 1973, Cornell University. Professor Natelson is
Assistant Professor of Law at Oklahoma City University. Prior to assuming that position, he
practiced real estate and condominium law for twelve years in New York and Colorado. He
is the author of numerous articles on real estate and a book on condominiums and other
planned communities. Professor Natelson's forthcoming book on the Law of Property Own-
ers' Associations will be published by Little, Brown and Company.
1. S. LEE, BUYER'S HANDBOOK FOR COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 4 (1978) (twenty
years from 1978). "The number of associations [in the United States] grew from approxi-
mately 1,000 in 1964 to approximately 85,000 in 1984 .... " Rosenberry, Actions of Com-
munity Association Boards: When Are They Valid and When Do They Create Liability? 13
REAL EST. L.J. 315, 315 (1985) [hereinafter Rosenberry]; see also Frances T. v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n, - Cal. 3d -, 723 P.2d 573, 578, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461 n.9 (1986); D.
CLURMAN, F. JACKSON & E. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 2-3 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter D. CLURMAN].
2. Most legal publications in the planned community field are practice guides. See, e.g.,
W. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION
LAW (1981); W. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS (1985); ALI-ABA, REAL ESTATE CONDOMINIUMS AND PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENTS (1974); ALI-ABA, CONDOMINIUM, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT, AND CONVER-
SION DOCUMENTS (1985); Natelson, Avoiding Perpetuities Problems in Condo Declarations,
13 COLO. LAW. 2229 (1984); Pearlstein, Developer Liability for Defects in Condominiums, 74
ILL. B.J. 18 (1985). The most important treatise is P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM
LAW & PRACTICE (1965) (regularly supplemented) [hereinafter P. ROHAN]. Much of this
multi-volume work is composed of forms. As will appear from the notes, infra, the bulk of
the law review literature has consisted of student notes. A significant exception is Hyatt &
Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium
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legislatures have had to face the inevitable problems almost un-
aided. It is hoped that this study will provide the courts and legis-
latures with some welcome assistance.
The theme of this article is official responsibility3-the obliga-
tions of association officials toward the entity they represent and,
directly or indirectly, the members they serve. The specific aspects
chosen for analysis are two: (1) the applicable standard of care to
be expected from association directors and officers, and (2) the "fi-
duciary" obligations of developers. Although many other facets of
official responsibility are in need of detailed treatment,4 the two
mentioned have proven to be quite enough for an article of this
size.
and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1976). Important legal work
is contained in the commentary to three uniform acts: The Uniform Condominium Act, 7
U.L.A. 421 (1985), the Uniform Planned Community Act, 7B U.L.A. 1 (1985), and the Uni-
form Common Interest Ownership Act, 7 U.L.A. 231 (1985).
Outside the purely legal realm is a multitude of guidebooks for condominium buyers,
owners, and managers. See, e.g., D. GOLDSTICK & C. JANIK, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO CO-OPS
& CONDOMINIUMS (1983); G. GRAY, CONDOMINIUMS: How TO Buy, SELL AND LIVE IN THEM
(1975); V. HUBIN, WARNING! CONDOMINIUM OWNERSHIP MAY BE DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND PEACE OF MIND (1976); S. LEE, supra note 1; R. NATELSON, HOW TO BUY AND
SELL A CONDOMINIUM (1981); H. ROTHENBERG, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT CONDOMINI-
UMS (1974); see also COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS INSTITUTE, CAI PUBLICATIONS CATALOG (1986).
The CAI is located at 1423 Powhatan Street, Suite 7, Alexandria, VA 22314, tel: (703) 548-
8600.
3. This is probably a better term than fiduciary responsibility, because, strictly speak-
ing, "fiduciary" duties are limited to the duty of loyalty and the responsibilities fairly infer-
able from the duty of loyalty. Thus, the obligation to avoid conflicts of interest and the
obligation to preserve trade secrets are technically "fiduciary" in nature, while the duty of
reasonable care is not. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 231, at 611-
12 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter H. HENN]. However, it is quite common to add the duties of
reasonable care and good faith to the list of "fiduciary" duties, and often this is encouraged
by applicable statutes. See, e.g., Frances T., __ Cal. 3d at -, 723 P.2d at 587, 229 Cal.
Rptr. at 470 (citations omitted).
It is in recognition of the popularity of this broader use of the phrase "fiduciary duty"
that the title of this article has been selected. However, the broader use can be very mis-
leading, even to otherwise competent lawyers and legislators, and, for that reason, should
probably be abandoned. Examples of such confusion are examined in Part III of this article.
4. Those interested in exploring this area further have many opportunities. Studies are
needed on the following questions, inter multa alia: (1) Should the obligations of officials of
on-going associations extend only to the entities themselves or to the individual members as
well? (2) If some should run to the individual members, which obligations should so run and
to what extent? (3) What should be the preferred procedural devices (class actions, individ-
ual actions, derivative actions, etc.) for pursuing claims based on breach of duty? (4) To
what extent, if at all, should the standards of official liability differ when an injured tort
plaintiff is (a) a member, or (b) a non-member of the association? (5) What specific steps
ought to be taken and/or what formulae ought to be applied in considering such specific
association actions as (a) adopting a rule regulating leasing or pets, (b) setting a level of
reserve funds, or (c) hiring a major contractor?
HeinOnline  -- 11 Vt. L. Rev. 422 1986
Property Owners Associations
The treatment of property owners associations in this article is
unified. That is to say, the content is applicable to all mandatory
associations, and is not limited (as writings in this field so often
are) to any one type, such as the condominium association or the
cooperative housing corporation. This is because, as will appear be-
low, the principles of official responsibility governing all residential
property owners associations are the same. Thus, for our purposes
the ownership structure of the property governed is of little impor-
tance. On the other hand, the reader should be cautioned against
applying the conclusions expressed herein beyond the realm of
property owners association law, for, as will be seen, the purposes
and requirements of these associations are quite different from
those of other entities, such as the business corporation, to which
they have been (often too readily) compared.
I. CONTEXT OF ISSUES OF OFFICIAL DUTY
A. The Functions of the Property Owners Association
In common usage, of course, the phrase "property owners as-
sociation" is frequently employed to denote certain voluntary civic
lobbying organizations. However, this article focuses exclusively on
the kind of association (1) which governs the use of a specific tract
(or tracts) of real estate (herein called the "planned community"),5
(2) which is established by corporate documents (in the case of a
cooperative) or covenants running with the land (in the case of a
subdivision), and (3) in which membership is, by the terms of the
organizing documents, required as a condition of property owner-
ship in the tract. Such associations are generally managed by an
elected board of directors, e may be incorporated or unincorpo-
rated,7 and are granted the power, by the terms of their organizing
5. The term "planned community" is used herein to refer to all four types of associa-
tion properties discussed-cooperatives, single-family home owner subdivisions, condomini-
ums, and hybrids. Cf. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(23), 7 U.L.A. 242
(1985) and UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNrry ACT § 1-103 (21), 7B U.L.A. 15 (1985) (excluding
condominiums and cooperatives from the definition of "planned community"). However, the
U.C.I.O.A. has been adopted only in Connecticut and Alaska, and the U.P.C.A. has not been
adopted by any state.
For planned communities which are not cooperatives, but which contain a significant
amount of common interests, the author is increasingly inclined toward a more technical
phrase of his own coinage: Interdependent Covenanted Subdivision (ICS).
6. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-103, 7 U.L.A. 504-05 (1985) ("executive
board").
7. Incorporation is required in a few states. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.104(4)(h)
(West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1603e(2) (Harrison Supp. 1985).
1986]
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documents, to impose mandatory assessments upon members and
upon their property interests.'
While the functions of no two associations are precisely alike,
broad generalizations can be made. Most associations are charged
with responsibility for maintaining those parts of the planned com-
munity set aside for common use ("common properties"), and are
given rule-making authority over all or part of the community. In
addition, the association frequently has other responsibilities, such
as providing security for the complex, regulating the sale and/or
rental of units, administering building restrictions, and organizing
social events.
Residential property owners associations are employed in four
kinds of real estate developments: (1) subdivisions of separately-
owned single-family homes, (2) housing cooperatives, (3) condo-
miniums, and (4) subdivisions of attached and semi-attached hous-
ing whose ownership formulae differ from that of a condominium.
The term "hybrid communities" will be used to denominate this
last group.9
B. The Traditional Associations
Associations governing subdivisions of single-family homes
made their first appearance in the United States during the nine-
teenth century, 10 and they have been reasonably common for sev-
eral decades.1" Despite this fact, the quantity of reported litigation
arising out of these associations has been rather small, and almost
none of it deals with questions of official duty.12 From the point of
view of the researcher, this is unfortunate because reported cases
8. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1366(a) (West Supp. 1986) ("planned developments" other
than condominiums and cooperatives); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-115, 7 U.L.A. 525-26
(1985). The Uniform Condominium Act has been adopted in nine states: Arizona, Maine,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and West Virginia.
7 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1986).
9. The term is used in Bonner Properties, Inc. v. Planning Board of the Township of
Franklin, 185 N.J. Super. 553, __, 449 A.2d 1350, 1361 (1982).
10. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES ASSOCIATION HANDBOOK 19, 39 (1964) [hereinaf-
ter HANDBOOK].
11. Id. at 18.
12. See, e.g., Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 355, 556 P.2d 758, 134
Cal. Rptr. 388 (1976); Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank,
278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938) (cases involving associations with common property
interests). A case involving fiduciary duty is Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526
P.2d 316 (1974).
[Vol. 11:421
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provided a valuable source of data on association management
problems. The absence of litigation may be due to the high degree
of member satisfaction reported by the authors of one published
study."3 A more likely explanation, however, is that the responsi-
bilities and financial significance of such associations have tradi-
tionally been minimal. 14 Thus, even in the event of a dispute, any
results which might be attained through litigation are simply not
worth the cost.'
The other traditional association, the cooperative housing cor-
poration, also dates back many years. 16 A cooperative housing cor-
poration is the record owner and legal manager of the building
subject to its regime, and the building's tenants are its sharehold-
ers. 17 Thus association responsibilities are substantial, and there
has been, accordingly, a respectable amount of litigation involving
these organizations. The reported cases included several on fiduci-
ary duty issues.'"
C. The Newer Associations: Condominiums and Hybrids
The current importance of association official responsibility is-
sues is due chiefly to the recent explosive growth in the number of
communities in the condominium and "hybrid" categories.19 In
every state, condominium ownership is closely defined by statute,
13. HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 15. This study had some design flaws. For example, of
247 communities surveyed, in 229 only individuals in power (officers or developers) were
interviewed. In only eighteen (seven percent) were ordinary members without positions of
responsibility interviewed. Id. at 15. One would, of course, expect a more favorable view
from those who manage affairs than those who do not. Additionally, the survey did not
include interviews with owners of cooperative or condominium units, who generally pay far
higher assessments to their association than do single-family homeowners, and are impacted
by it to a much greater extent.
14. Id. at 39-113, and passim.
15. The single-family homes associations survey cited supra found no community with
assessments in excess of $110 per year, with seventy-one percent at $30 or less per year
(1962 dollars). Id. at 20-22. Assessments in condominium, hybrid, and cooperative associa-
tions are often well over $100 per month.
16. D. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 181; S. LEE, supra note 1, at 2; R. NATELSON, supra
note 2, at 18.
17. D. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 185; S. LEEj supra note 1, at 2-3.
18. E.g., Northridge Coop. Section No. 1 v. 32nd Avenue Constr. Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 514,
141 N.E.2d 802, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957); Shore Terrace Coop., Inc. v. Roche, 25 A.D.2d 666,
268 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1966); Mitchell Gardens No. 3 Co-op. Corp. v. Third B N Assocs., Inc., 5
Misc. 2d 454, 162 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
19. The number of condominiums has now far outpaced the number of cooperatives, for
example. R. NATELSON, supra note 2, at 18.
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and each applicable statute spells out the formula necessary for a
housing development to qualify as a condominium within that
state.20 These formulae differ surprisingly little. They provide for
each homeowner to hold title to a three-dimensional block of air
space, which block of air space is usually (but, in some states, need
not be) limited to the confines of a building.2 The applicable stat-
utes also specify that appurtenant to air-space ownership, and in-
separable from it, is a fixed percentage interest in all parts of the
condominium outside the individually owned blocks of air space.
These co-owned portions of the complex are denominated "com-
mon elements" or "general common elements."2 Common ele-
ments include the structural members of each building (floors,
walls, roofs), facilities within the air space blocks utilized by more
than one unit owner (e.g., common pipes), and the grounds, recrea-
tional facilities, and other exterior portions of the complex.2" Al-
though a condominium association may own real property in its
own name,2 it does not own the common elements; it merely ad-
20. Country Greens Village One Owner's [sic] Ass'n, Inc. v. Meyers, 158 Ga. App. 609,
281 S.E.2d 346 (1981) (townhouse community in which association owned the common areas
held to be outside the statutory definition of "condominium"). But see Bonner Properties,
185 N.J. Super. 553, 449 A.2d 1350 (extending condominium act to include a hybrid
community).
21. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-33-103(4) (1982), which requires that an "individual
air space unit" consists of "enclosed" areas. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 503(b) (West
1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1302(1) (1975). A number of statutes do not require that
individual air space be limited by the confines of the building. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
718.103(23) (West Supp. 1985). More specific authorization for including balconies, terraces,
and other appurtenances as part of an air space block is found in N.Y. REAL PROP. L. § 339-
e(14) (McKinney Supp. 1986). Apparently the balcony was part of the unit in Roundtree
Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984), but it is unclear from
the opinion whether the complex involved in that case was truly a condominium.
22. The term must be distinguished from the term "common area," which is usually
employed to denominate property titled to the association. See, e.g., Raven's Cove
Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., Inc., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 787, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334,
335 (1981). The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act applies the term "common ele-
ments" to both co-owned and association-owned property, but the practice has not caught
on. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(4), 7 U.L.A. 240 (1985).
23. For a non-technical introduction, see R. NATELSON, supra note 2, at 15-22.
24. This is specifically or impliedly authorized in some condominium statutes. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT., Ch. 30, §§ 318.3, 318.4(g), (k) (West Supp. 1986); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT §
3-102(a)(8), 7 U.L.A. 502 (1985). But see Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v. Millman, 475
So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (holding that statutory authorization to acquire condominium units
did not include authorization to hold title to other realty). For an example of a condomin-
ium declaration in which association ownership of property is authorized, see 1B P. ROHAN,
supra note 2, at App.-148 (1983).
One of the condominium associations for which the author served as corporate counsel,
while he was in private practice, held the deeds to certain recreation areas (clubhouse, ten-
nis courts, swimming pools, etc.). However, most of the community's grounds were co-owned
426
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ministers them. Nonetheless, the financial result is nearly the same
as it would have been had the association owned them.
2 5
From the foregoing, it can readily be seen that administration
of the common elements is the major responsibility of the condo-
minium association. Since management of the common elements
requires significant amounts of money, and since that money usu-
ally (although not invariably)26 is routed through the association,
individual owners have a large stake in association decision-mak-
ing. For this reason, the condominium, despite its novelty in this
country,2" is already responsible for more reported litigation than
any of the other three community types. 28 As will appear below,
the reported condominium cases have included a number of legal
battles waged on issues of official duty.
Also responsible for a significant amount of litigation are the
hybrid communities. Like condominiums, hybrids feature exten-
sive common property and organizational documents which con-
template a high degree of interdependence among unit owners. De-
velopers give hybrids a variety of names-"town homes," "cluster
homes," "patio homes," and "atrium homes"-all more descriptive
of their architectural styles than of the legal relationships which
govern them.2"
common elements.
25. One difference has to do with real property taxes: Since the title owner usually pays
real property tax, in a condominium the individual owners, rather than the association, will
generally bear that expense. But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103 (10) (1986 Supp.) (taxing
association property pro rata to unit owners, rather than to the association).
26. The most frequent exceptions are for the limited common elements, maintenance
responsibility for which is occasionally in the owner of the unit to which they are appurte-
nant. See, e.g., CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION, COTTONWOOD VILLAS (Adams County, Colorado)
§ 17(a)(3) (air conditioning units). A declaration amendment altering maintenance responsi-
bilities was at issue in Hillsboro Light Towers, Inc. v. Sherrill, 474 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985). See also UNIF. CONDOMINIUM Ac'r § 2-108 comment 1, 7 U.L.A. 470 (1985).
27. The first American jurisdiction to adopt a condominium statute was Puerto Rico
(1951). However, no state enacted legislation until the 1960's.
There have been numerous attempts, in both legal and popular literature, to attribute
the origin of the condominium to ancient Rome. See, e.g., R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK &
D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 37, n.19 (1984); B. HARWOOD, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES
485 (1986); H. ROTHENBERO, supra note 2, at 9. This is without a doubt an error.
However, the story of how the notion of "Roman origin" crept into American legal
scholarship is a tale both instructive and amusing. It is told in this author's forthcoming
Comments on the Historiography of Condominium: The Myth of Roman Origin, 12 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. - (1987), which also summarizes the actual history of the institution.
28. As will become apparent, most of the court decisions discussed infra are condomin-
ium cases.
29. Communities containing any of these styles of architecture may, of course, be held
19861
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Common to all hybrids is the fact that their ownership struc-
ture does not comply with the locally applicable condominium act.
Beyond that point, generalizations about their ownership structure
are difficult to make, because there are great differences among
them. One widely adopted scheme is to grant to each individual
purchaser full vertical ownership (i.e., including air space above
and ground beneath) of the lot on which his (usually attached)
home is situate, while deeding to the association ownership of all
parts of the planned community not encompassed by individually
owned lots.30 Numerous other ownership splits are encountered.3
Moreover, the division of maintenance responsibility in hybrid
communities may deviate significantly from the division of formal
property ownership.3 2 The dividing lines between individual and
common maintenance in each community, like those between indi-
vidual and common ownership, can be determined only by consult-
ing its operative documents.
D. The Officials of the Property Owners Association
A developer planning any of these four kinds of complexes is
required, by law or by good practice, to institute an association
in condominium ownership, while some (particularly townhouse developments) may be plat-
ted so as to avoid a property owner's association or any co-owned property except party
walls. In the author's experience, however, many real estate sales people and prospective
purchasers-and even some lawyers-are under the impression that architectural style
somehow determines legal ownership structure.
30. Most, but not all, "townhome" communities employ this pattern. The popularity of
this scheme may well have its origin in the issuance of a form set of covenants by the Fed-
eral Housing Administration. Prefatory Note, UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT, 7B U.L.A. 1
(1985). Examples of the scheme appear in Country Greens Village One Owner's [sic] Ass'n,
158 Ga. App. 609, 281 S.E.2d 346, Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334,
and Spring Mill Townhomes Ass'n v. Osla Financial Services, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 774, 80
Ill. Dec. 378, 465 N.E.2d 490 (1984). This is also the form of hybrid community contem-
plated by the uniform "Planned Unit Development Rider" issued by the Federal National
Mortgage Ass'n (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (FHLMA). R.
KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 416 (1979).
31. Examples are those found in Del Mar Beach Club Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Imperial
Contracting Co., Inc., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981) (association owned all
of complex except for individual air space units) and in COVENANTS, MAGNA CARTA
TOWNHOMES (Denver County, Colorado) (entire complex divided among unit owners with
extensive "common easements"). See also Prefatory Note, UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT,
7B U.L.A. 1 (1985).
32. For example, it is common for the association to have maintenance responsibility
over the (privately owned) exteriors of units. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF COVENANTS, YORK-
TOWN HOMES ASSOCIATION (filed for record at Book 1917, Page 878 Adams County, Colo-
rado), art. vi, § 1, at 886.
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rather early.33 This is usually done by filing an organizational doc-
ument (i.e., its articles of 'incorporation or articles of association)
when the community's covenants or condominium declaration is
filed. Almost always, establishment is completed before the closing
of title on the first unit sold. At that point, the association be-
comes legally responsible for the maintenance of the common
properties. As a matter of practice, however, the developer often
retains much of the maintenance burden throughout his sales
campaign.
Because an association requires a government, the developer
must select individuals to staff its board of directors and to serve
as its officers (who are usually elected by the board). If few units
have been sold, there may not be enough property owners available
for this purpose. Additionally, those property owners who are
available may not be willing to undertake leadership positions, or
may be ill-suited for the task. Since the developer's sales campaign
depends upon well-managed common areas and a cooperative
board of directors, it is in his interest to ensure that he remains in
control of the association during this period. Indeed, developer
control in the early years is almost universally recommended by
planned community experts,3 ' both as a way of protecting the de-
veloper's investment and as a method of training the new owners
in association management.
Throughout an initial period of months or years, therefore, a
majority of the association board of directors and most (or all) of
its officers are nominees of the development company. Typical de-
veloper nominees include the principals of the company, their
spouses, the resident manager and/or sales agent, and the corpo-
rate attorney. Over time, unit-purchaser participation in associa-
tion affairs expands. Eventually, the developer's sales campaign
comes to an end, and the purchasers fill all association positions.
The legal standards governing association officials are there-
fore relevant in evaluating the conduct of four classes of people: (1)
unit purchasers who have been elected to association office, (2) the
development company in its role as "corporate promoter," (3) the
33. Written discussions of the development process in these communities abound. See,
e.g., W. HYATT, CONDOMINIUMS AND HOME OWNER ASSOCIATIONS: A GUIDE TO THE DEVELOP-
MENT PROCESS, supra note 2.
34. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at xii, 4, 24, and 233 if; 1 P. ROHAN, supra note
2, § 17A.02(4); Rose, Nonprofit "Resident" Association Trends, in TRENDS IN NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATION LAW 87, 89 (1977).
19861
HeinOnline  -- 11 Vt. L. Rev. 429 1986
Vermont Law Review [Vol. 11:421
development company in its role as "controlling shareholder" dur-
ing its sales campaign, and (4) the nominees of the developer who
hold positions in the association. The ensuing parts of this article
will examine specific issues surrounding the obligations of officials
in each of these classes. Beyond its scope are the duties of hired
agents such as professional management companies.
E. Previous Treatment of Official Duties in Property Owners
Associations
Most of the law governing the conduct of association officials
has been developed by the courts. Reasoning by analogy from prin-
ciples applicable to business enterprises and non-profit founda-
tions,3" the judges have imposed the usual duties of due care 36 and
good faith.37 They have held that association officials have an obli-
gation to follow the bylaws and other rules of their complexes, 38 to
keep adequate records, 9 to exercise appropriate supervision over
the affairs of the association and the community,40 to maintain
capital reserves,'41 and to notify members or prospective members
of certain matters.42 They have applied the usual prohibitions on
self-dealing and have emitted the customary exhortations to loy-
alty.43 Furthermore, the judges have recognized some of the com-
mon defenses to liability, especially the Business Judgment Rule.4,
35. See, e.g., Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (citing Stern
v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F.
Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (non-profit corporation case)); Paplexiou v. Tower West Condo-
miniums, 167 N.J. Super. 516, -, 401 A.2d 280, 285-86 (Ch. Div. 1979) (citing Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (Business Judgment Rule taken from
for-profit corporation case)).
36. E.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
37. E.g., Schwartzmann v. Ass'n of Apartment Owner's of Bridgehaven, 33 Wash. App.
397, 655 P.2d 1177 (1982).
38. E.g., Wolinsky v. Kadison, 114 Ill. App. 3d 527, 70 Ill. Dec. 277 (1983).
39. E.g., Winter v. Playa del Sol, Inc., 353 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); cf.
Fitzgerald v. La Freniere, 658 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (developer unfamiliar with
corporate recordkeeping but required to account to association).
40. Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 800-01, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Penthouse North Ass'n, Inc. v. Lombardi, 461 So. 2d 1350, 1352 (Fla.
1984).
43. Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 800-01, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 344; Siller v. Hartz
Mountain Assocs., 93 N.J. 370, 461 A.2d 568 (1983); Scott v. Williams, 607 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.
Ct. Civ. App. 1980).
44. Rywalt, 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316; Schmeck v. Sea Oats Condominiums
Ass'n, Inc., 441 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Papalexiou, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401
430
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Although dealing with a new unfamiliar subject, the common
law reasoning of the courts has generally served them well. Yet
many of their pronouncements have led to confusion because their
language has not always been precise. Moreover, the legislators
drafting statutes in the area have tended to borrow the words in
judicial opinions without adequate consideration of the contexts in
which they were uttered. Those words have thus been applied in
ways both inappropriate and overbroad.4 5 As will be seen in Part
IV, some of the commentators have confused matters further-at
times misunderstanding the issues involved, and at other times
serving extraneous political purposes of their own.
F. Overview of Analysis in Parts II Through IV
The facets of official duty selected for analysis in Parts II, III,
and IV were chosen both for their inherent importance and for the
degree of confusion which has hitherto attended them. Three ques-
tions have been identified for examination, the first two relevant to
all association officials and the last applicable specifically to the
nominees of developers. They are as follows:
(1) Are association officials to be held to a "reasonable care"
standard or, as unpaid, part-time volunteers, to something less?
(Part II)
(2) Should the Business Judgment Rule be employed to re-
duce the applicable standard of care within the usual scope of that
rule? (Part III)
(3) To what extent should fiduciary obligations be imposed
upon the developer and his nominees? (Part IV)
For reasons that will become apparent, this author has con-
cluded, first, that a general standard of reasonable care is appro-
priate in reviewing all actions of association officials; second, that
while some of the lore surrounding the Business Judgment Rule is
useful in defining the duty owed by association officials, the Rule
itself is irrelevant to property owners associations and should be
A.2d 280; Schwartzmann, 33 Wash. App. 397, 655 P.2d 1177. Some of the cases cited in this
note and in notes 35-43 supra are thumbnailed in Rosenberry, supra note 1.
45. Besides the Uniform Condominium Act states (see supra note 8), comprehensive
legislation has been adopted in several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
718.101-718.622 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 301 et seq. (Smith Hurd Supp.
1986).
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disregarded; and, third, that while developer nominees owe to the
association the same duties of good faith, reasonable care, and con-
tractual compliance as to any other officials, it is improper to con-
ceive of their obligations as "fiduciary" in the strict sense of the
word.
II. THE STANDARD OF CARE: SHOULD IT BE RELAXED FOR
ASSOCIATION OFFICIALS?
A. The "Reasonable Care" Rule
There seems to be general agreement that directors and of-
ficers of property owners associations have an obligation of due
care, ordinary care, or reasonable care analogous to that imposed
upon their counterparts in business enterprises."" For the most
part, the actual measure applied in the reported cases and by the
applicable statutes has been similar to that imposed upon busi-
nessmen."' However, this consistency has not been universal. A few
46. The "due care" standard and standards comparable to it are applied to business
officials in the majority of American jurisdictions. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 29-43 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1985) [hereinafter ALI).
A recent pronouncement of the California Supreme Court, Frances T., - Cal. 3d
-, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456, 723 P.2d 573, distinguishes between tort liability to a shareholder
qua shareholder (arising out of the breach of a director's duty to the entity he serves) and
liability to a shareholder qua third party (e.g., personal injury arising from negligence). This
author is not fully convinced of the validity of the distinction, which seems to be based in
part on the California statutory scheme, and on a misguided attempt to accommodate the
Business Judgment Rule (see infra Part III). To the extent that such a distinction is valid,
this article focuses upon the former sort of liability.
47. In accordance with proper English usage, the masculine form as employed herein
serves as the form of indefinite gender where the context so requires.
Cases applying a "reasonable care" standard in association settings are numerous. In
many of these, the review results from a challenge to an association rule or bylaw. See, e.g.,
Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Amor-
uso v. Board of Managers of Westchester Hills Condominium, 38 A.D.2d 845, 330 N.Y.S.2d
107 (1972); Forest Park Coop., Inc. v. Hellman, 2 Misc. 2d 183, 152 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct.
Queens Co. 1956); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977). However, the courts have extended the rule of reasonable discretion beyond
mere rule-making. Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (relying on three
rule-making cases to uphold reasonableness of board's order forcing owners to remove
locks); Schmeck, 441 So. 2d 1092 (reasonableness of board's response to water problems
upheld). The "rule of reason" governs board conduct in Uniform Condominium Act states,
UNIP. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-103(a), 7 U.L.A. 504 (1985), and is also a part of many non-
profit corporation statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney
Supp. 1986). None of these statutes or cases draws a distinction between business and asso-
ciation standards. Cf. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (initial wording
almost identical with Not-For-Profit provision).
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cases and commentators have expressed some uneasiness with the
business standard, and have suggested that association officials
may owe something less to the people they represent than do the
executives of business corporations. The usual reason given for this
conclusion is that association directors and officers are commonly
part-time, unpaid volunteers."" For example, in his treatise on non-
profit corporations, Professor Oleck acknowledges the theoretical
applicability of the due care rule, but adds:
If a director is to serve as such in a full-time capacity, he is
held to the standard applicable to a man who is running his
own business. This high standard seldom applies in non-profit
corporations, where directors usually are part-time voluntary
servants, deriving no pecuniary benefits from their work.4
Comparable sentiments have been expressed by a New York
Supreme Court justice.50 Kleinman v. High Point of Hartsdale I
Condominium was a suit by unit owners against their condomin-
ium board of managers for alleged negligence in failing to make
repairs. The plaintiffs sought to impose personal liability upon the
defendants, but were faced with an exculpatory provision in the
community's organizational documents. This provision limited di-
rector liability to willful misconduct and bad faith. In accordance
with the great weight of authority, the court upheld the exculpa-
tory clause."' Instead of relying merely upon that authority, how-
48. This appears to be true in nearly all associations. A typical provision denying com-
pensation to directors is found in 1B P. ROHAN, supra note 2, at App. - 192.28 (182-83)
(bylaws providing that "[n]o compensation shall be paid to the President or the Vice-Presi-
dent or any Director . . . for acting as such Officer or Director"). In view of the magnitude
of their responsibilities, there is little, if any, justification for denying association directors
and officers compensation for their work.
49. H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 477 (1974).
50. 108 Misc. 2d 581, 438 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1979). Closely aligned
with commentaries such as Professor Oleck's and cases such as Kleinman are suggestions
that directors nominated by the developer have a higher duty to the home owners than do
the owners' own representatives. See, e.g., Troy v. Village Green Condominium Project, 149
Cal. App. 2d 135, 145-47, 196 Cal. Rptr. 680, 686-87 (1983), aff'd sub nom. Frances T., -
Cal. 3d -, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (holding that negligence by a home-
owner director is not a breach of fiduciary duty, as well, despite a previous holding that
negligence by a developer-director was a breach of fiduciary duty). This case may be justi-
fied, however, as a better understanding of the scope of duties truly fiduciary (i.e., arising
out of the duty of loyalty) as opposed to those imposed for other reasons (i.e., due care, good
faith). See also UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT § 3-103(a), 7 U.L.A. 504 (1985), imposing ordinary
care obligations on home owner representatives but "fiduciary" obligations on developer
nominees. As demonstrated in Part IV, infra, this conclusion is perverse.
51. To the extent such clauses provide relief from liability for ordinary negligence (as
opposed to more culpable conduct), they are generally upheld even as to trustees. G.G. Bo-
19861
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ever, the judge chose to enunciate some policy reqsons for his deci-
sion. Included in his decision was this troublesome sentence: "This
type of gratuitous quasi-public service should be encouraged by ex-
oneration from personal liability rather than be discouraged by im-
position of personal and individual liability.
52
The judge deciding Kleinman did not offer any suggestion as
to what, in absence of an exculpatory clause, the burden of care for
association officials should be. Is the voluntary nature of service to
result in liability only for conduct more culpable than negligence?
Or is volunteerism but one factor to take into account in determin-
ing whether due care standards have been met?
The elements of part-time service and volunteerism would not
seem to justify adopting a standard lower than the reasonable care
rule. Neither the part-time nature of the work, nor its lack of com-
pensation, is unique to associations or other non-profit organiza-
tions. Both elements are characteristic of many business director-
ships. Indeed, most directors of business corporations serve part-
time-sometimes on a more occasional basis than would be wise
for association officials.5 3 The courts have long recognized that
while the amount of knowledge held by "outside" directors will be
less than that possessed by "insiders," each director must still ex-
ercise the degree of care appropriate in his circumstances." Fur-
thermore, many business directors serve for no pay or for nominal
pay. It has been, in fact, the traditional expectation that they do
so. Nevertheless, they remain subject to the reasonable care rule,
although the courts hold that compensation is one factor to con-
sider in determining whether that standard has been met.
55
GERT & G.T. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS 339, 341 (1973). Trustees are usually held to a higher
standard than corporate directors. H. OLECK, supra note 49, at 477. Another case upholding
such a clause in a condominium setting is Kelley v. Astor Investors, 106 Il. 2d 505, 478
N.E.2d 1346 (1985). Such clauses are not uncommon (see, e.g., 1B P. ROHAN, supra note 2,
Appendix C-4, at App. 216.39), but as the text of this article would imply, this writer has
doubts about their wisdom.
52. 438 N.Y.S.2d at 48.
53. See, e.g., Anderson v. Akers, 7 F. Supp. 924, 930 (W.D. Ky. 1934), modified sub
nom. Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), modified sub nom. Anderson v.
Atherton, 302 U.S. 643 (1937) (bank directors usually serve part-time).
54. Id. See also H. HENN, supra note 3, § 237, at 623.
55. H. HENN, supra note 3, § 244, at 664-66 (traditional rule that directors are not com-
pensated); § 234, at 623 (compensation is a permissible factor in determining if director had
exercised reasonable care, but not lowering the reasonable care standard itself). As will
shortly appear, the motivations of association directors in seeking office are often no more
altruistic than those of business directors. See infra text following note 61.
[Vol. 11:421
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If it be conceded that "reasonable care" is the appropriate
measure of the conduct of association officials, there remains the
question of how indulgently it should be applied. Here the lesson
of recent experience is clear: not very indulgently at all.
B. Recent Experience and the Standard of Care
Because the individual units in most of the newer planned
communities are highly interdependent, association conduct has a
substantial, in truth overwhelming, influence upon the value of
those units. Good association management can add significant
value (both financial and non-financial) to the homes it governs.
Unscrupulous or careless management can cause enormous suffer-
ing and loss.
Indeed, individual owners in a misgoverned planned commu-
nity are more likely to incur significant personal damage than are
most individual shareholders of a poorly run profit corporation.
For one thing, their investment is greater. For most people, a home
is the largest investment they will ever make. Beyond its financial
value, moreover, a dwelling unit has a unique value, both as a
home and as an identifiable piece of real estate .5 Association mis-
government can do more than depress the sales price of a unit; it
can make living there personally uncomfortable and/or personally
dangerous, and it can make the property virtually unsalable.
The unique kind of torture that can be inflicted by poor man-
agement is an aspect of association living that has received insuffi-
cient attention in the press and from scholarly commentators.
While in law practice, this writer became aware that poor manage-
ment, and the suffering it brings, is now a fact of life in many
planned communities. Poor management may be the result of mal-
ice or of ignorance or of negligence. To those who have borne the
results, the causes can matter little. Suffice it to say that human
suffering may be inflicted in numerous ways: as a result of insuffi-
cient safety and security measures, failure of association officials to
consult or follow expert opinion, officially-sanctioned (or officially
ignored) harassment or neglect, personal pique, and the like. Ad-
mittedly, this kind of conduct does not predominate in most hous-
56. This is the same special value that serves as justification for specific performance of
real estate sales contracts. Farnsworth, Legal Remedies For Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM.
L. REV. 1144, 1167-69 (1970); A. Harrell, Toward A Unified Law Of Remedies 154-55 (1981)
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Southern Methodist University).
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ing complexes, but it occurs, to a greater or lesser extent, almost
everywhere.17
The owner of publicly traded stock may respond to corporate
mismanagement by selling his shares; however, due to the peculiar-
ities of the real estate market, association mismanagement can
make sale of a unit in a poorly run complex next to impossible.
Local real estate brokers, aware of the community's problems and
conscious of their own potential liability, may steer prospective
purchasers away. Shabby maintenance of the common proper-
ties-incurable by the individual seller-may deter purchasers;
and the immovability of real property makes nationwide marketing
difficult. When the frustrated seller lowers his price, he is likely to
be rewarded with a number of offers far lower ("low ball offers"),
tendered by profiteers who sense his desperation. Thus, the ulti-
mate sales price may be well below appraised value-if the unit
can be sold at all.58
Added to this is the fact that all personal assets of association
members are generally vulnerable to the effects of irresponsible of-
ficial expenditure. This is clearly so if the association is not incor-
porated; but even if the association is incorporated, it remains
true. Members of a property owners association cannot simply fold
their tents and leave their shares behind them; their very tents are
immovable. Excessive association spending will have to be paid by
association assessments. These are enforceable by liens against the
individual units. That much is well known. What is not so well
known is that most planned community declarations provide that
assessments are also the personal obligations of the unit owners.
These obligations are therefore enforceable against other personal
57. One article which details the impact of association mismanagement on homeowners
is Smith, Condos: Ghettos of the 1990's? 12 DEN. MAG. 44 (1982), which describes the tribu-
lations of several former clients of this author. These people were the victims of a campaign
of harassment, which eventually culminated in the ransacking of their apartment. They
were, however, unable to sell their unit due to the decrepit condition of the common areas
and the high level of monthly assessments. Attempts to reach a political settlement failed,
and legal action was commenced, with inconclusive results. Not many such fact patterns
have appeared in the reported cases, although more will as time passes. Perhaps the closest
reported analogue is found in Scott v. Williams, 607 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (in-
vestor-owners who controlled the board engaged in extensive self-dealing).
58. The tribulations of selling condominiums in a slow market-where property almost
cannot be given away despite reasonable "appraised values"-are being felt in Denver at the
time of this writing. See, e.g., Thorn, Condo Sellers Hear Cry of Albatross, Rocky Mountain
News, May 12, 1986, at 38, col. 1. A discussion of the distress sale market appears in Natel-
son, Mending the Social Compact, 66 OR. L. REV. - (1986).
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assets, and they survive the sale of the property." In this way also,
the damage that can be inflicted by association mismanagement
can exceed that inflicted through mismanagement of comparably
sized business corporations.
Of course the beleaguered unit owner always has an electoral
alternative: He can rally a slate of candidates to exorcise the
scoundrels. One problem with this is that the damage might al-
ready have been done. Additionally, there are other problems. Vot-
ing fraud is not unknown, and a questionable election can be chal-
lenged only in court. Moreover, the very mismanagement which
initially caused problems may make reform impossible: When own-
ers cannot sell their units but must move from the community,
they rent them out. Non-resident owners are notoriously difficult
to mobilize for an election or for any other community purpose.
This writer has seen successful electoral revolutions in renter-dom-
inated subdivisions, but they are exceedingly rare.6 0
What all of this comes down to is the following: People guilty
of association mismanagement usually have a streak of obstinacy
which makes redress by any method short of legal action almost
impossible. Yet litigation is an expensive proposition for middle-
and lower-income home owners, especially when management has
access to the association treasury to pay its defense costs. Judicial
relaxation of the reasonable care standard would raise those costs
further and render it even more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain
compensation-even if local derivative action statutes hold out the
prospect of ultimate reimbursement.61
The foregoing tale of woe may also serve to cast some light (or
some gloom) upon the motivations of those who "volunteer" to
seek association office. While many candidates (perhaps most) run
for office with the best of motives, for many others the reasons are
more complex. Combined with the natural instinct to do good,
there are the same motivations that cause many people to sit on
59. This is provided in most planned community documentation. See, e.g., 1B P.
ROHAN, supra note 2, at App. C-2, App. - 163.
60. The writer is familiar with only one which was fully successful. There, a home
owner (who was not otherwise employed) in a Denver area condominium complex was able
to conduct a campaign to educate absentee owners regarding the state of management at the
complex. The educational campaign lasted over two years. In the end she was able to obtain
enough absentee ballots to revolutionize the makeup of the board of directors.
61. This is true at least where association members may maintain members' derivative
actions. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FOR-PROFIT CoRP. LAW § 623 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
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the boards of profit-making corporations for little or no pay: the
lure of prestige, the need for enhanced professional standing, and
an interest in improving one's business connections. There may
also be uglier impulses-desires leashed in business corporations
by the profit motive, but in property owners associations allowed
to run free: the desire to wield power over one's neighbors, or to
deny it to others, or to take personal revenge for actual or per-
ceived slights.
For those home owner fiduciaries whose motives remain pure,
there are institutional devices available to relieve the harshness of
personal liability. Indemnification provisions are now common and
are generally authorized by non-profit corporation laws.62 Direc-
tors' and officers' insurance, once unavailable for association offi-
cials, can now be purchased readily from any of several insurance
companies.6 Hence there remains little, if any, justification for im-
posing standards of care less exacting than those appropriate to
the circumstances-and the circumstances mandate standards at
least as high as those imposed upon part-time business directors.
Of course it may be argued that holding association directors
to a reasonable care standard may discourage some from seeking
office. 4 As a practical matter, however, most courts have been ap-
plying business-type due care standards to association directors
without, apparently, causing a significant shortage in the number
of people willing to serve.6 The real danger is not that there will
be a shortage of personnel, but that the courts will lower the appli-
cable level of care, and thereby invite additional management
abuse.
62. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-22-101(1)(n) (1973); N.Y. NOT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. LAW
§§ 722, 723 (McKinney Supp. 1986).
63. 1 P. ROHAN, supra note 2, § 17A.08, at 17A-15 (1986). A variety of companies write
such insurance, and the rates or availability have not, as of this date, been affected by the
recent rise in liability rates. Moreover, claims on directors and officers insurance are rare.
Telephone interview with Porter Berry, insurance agent at McEldowney, McWilliams,
Deardeuff & Journey, Inc., Oklahoma City (June 17, 1986).
64. This objection is invariably raised when there is a suggestion that individual officers
and directors may be liable for their acts. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1986, Real Estate
Section, at 1, col. 1, responding to the decision in Frances T., - Cal. 3d __, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 456, 723 P.2d 573, a case in which official neglect was particularly egregious and the
alleged consequences-horrible. (Neglect of outdoor lighting over many months despite re-
peated notice enabled intruder to rape and rob plaintiff.) However, the authors of the Uni-
form Condominium Act are of the opinion that the ordinary care rule is adequate to "in-
crease the willingness of unit owners to serve as officers and members of the board." UNIF.
CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-103, comment 1, 7 U.L.A. 505 (1985).
65. See supra note 47.
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III. ASSOCIATION OFFICIALS AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE66
A. Introduction
The reasonable care standard has been an important bench-
mark in judicial review of the conduct of business directors. How-
ever, within one particular sphere the standards of review are
lower. Specifically, the courts have been reluctant to second-guess
decisions that are essentially entrepreneurial in nature, both be-
cause of the inherent unfairness of judging with the benefit of
hindsight, and because individual judges are not necessarily
trained or experienced in business matters. 7 This judicial solici-
tude for business decision-making is called the Business Judgment
Rule.
Explicit formulations of the Business Judgment Rule differ,
but its practical effect has been to widen the scope of official dis-
cretion beyond that which would be permitted under a pure negli-
gence standard, so long as certain conditions precedent are met.6
As a result, business executives and directors exercising profes-
sional discretion usually have been protected from liability unless
their conduct falls well below the minimum level of due
care-perhaps to the level of gross negligence,6 9 recklessness, 0 or
bad faith. 1
Despite the fact that property owners associations are not
businesses, a few cases have held that their directors and officers
are protected by the Business Judgment Rule.7 1 Part III will in-
66. The writer of this article is indebted to Steven A. Fishman, Assistant Professor of
Law, Oklahoma City University, for bringing some of the developments discussed in this
section to his attention. The opinions expressed herein are attributable to this writer alone,
as are all errors in fact and reasoning.
67. On the lack of business expertise of judges, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich.
459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1918), followed in Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237
N.E.2d 776 (1968).
68. A.L.I., supra note 46, at 75; see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983) and authorities collected therein.
69. This is the standard applied in Delaware. Joy, 692 F.2d at 873.
70. A.L.I., supra note 46, at 68.
71. Id. at 68-69. Just how egregious business conduct must be to fall outside the protec-
tion of the Rule is quite uncertain. A discussion appears in Arscht, The Business Judgment
Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 118-21 (1979). Earlier commentaries are collected
there at 120, n.118.
72. E.g., Rywalt, 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316; Papalexiou, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401
A.2d 280; Schwartzmann, 33 Wash. App. 397, 655 P.2d 1177. See generally Note, Judicial
Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REv. 647, 663-67 (1981) (for a related
discussion).
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quire into the usefulness, if any, of the Rule in evaluating the con-
duct of the officials of property owners associations. Focus will be
on two aspects of the Rule which have recently received considera-
ble attention because of their inherent interest in today's corporate
takeover climate. This writer will discuss them because they help
to illustrate how the standard of care applicable to fiduciaries gen-
erally should be administered when reviewing the actions of associ-
ation officials.
B. The Requirement of an Informed Decision
Over the past few years there has been a substantial amount
of scholarly discussion' s about the nature of the protection af-
forded by the Business Judgment Rule and the conditions prece-
dent which must be satisfied before its protection may be invoked.
Over the same period, important judicial decisions have been is-
sued, mostly by the federal courts and the courts of New York and
Delaware, which have proved the same questions.74
Some writers have envisioned the Business Judgment Rule as
a "safe harbor" from the uncertainties of the due care standard.
According to this analysis, corporate officials who have successfully
navigated around the shoals (i.e., the conditions precedent) block-
ing the harbor may find their sanctuary within. The conditions
precedent are set forth more or less as follows: (1) There must be
an actual business decision, not simply an omission due to neglect
or inattention (although a well-considered decision not to take ac-
tion is acceptable, of course);7 5 (2) The action must be taken in
good faith;76 (3) The persons making the decision must be disinter-
73. See, e.g., A.L.I., supra note 46; Hinsey, Duty of Care: Business Judgment and the
American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the
Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609 (1984); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life
In the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW 1 (1985); Arsht, supra note 71; Note,
The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV.
600 (1980).
74. E.g., Joy, 692 F.2d 880; Hanson Trust PLC v. MLSCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d
264 (2d Cir. 1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); In Re
Western World Funding, 52 Bankr. 743 (D. Nev. 1985); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
392 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432
A.2d 814 (1981); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 448 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985).
75. A.L.I., supra note 46 at 60-63; In Re Western World Funding, 52 Bankr. 743 (D.
Nev. 1985).
76. A.L.I., supra note 46, at 7; Medford Trust Co., 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649. See also
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ested. Self-dealing is not protected by the Rule, and self-dealers
will bear the burden of proving their actions reasonable and fair to
the corporation;"7 (4) The decision must be an informed one.
It is upon the last condition, especially, that judicial and
scholarly eyes have recently been fixed. To be sure, there has long
been authority"8 for the position that a business judgment must be
an informed one-that a corporate director or officer should collect
data before acting. But the requirement had rarely been invoked as
a deciding factor in judicial review-until just a few years ago.
1. Recent Cases
In Auerbach v. Bennett,79 a 1979 New York case, the court
had before it a shareholders' derivative action in which a special
litigation committee had voted to order its corporate counsel to
move for dismissal of the action. The trial judge granted the mo-
tion, but his order was reversed by the appellate division. On ap-
peal, New York's highest court reinstated the trial judge's order of
dismissal, basing its holding on the Business Judgment Rule. How-
-ever, the court's analysis was pregnant with future implications:
We turn then to the action of the special litigation committee
itself which comprised two components. First, there was the
selection of procedures appropriate to the pursuit of its
charge, and second, there was the ultimate substantive deci-
sion, predicated on the procedures chosen and the data pro-
duced thereby, not to pursue the claims advanced in the
shareholders' derivative action.-0
The court of appeals held that the second component of the
committee's decision-the substantive part-fell "squarely within
the embrace of the business judgment doctrine" and was therefore
"outside the scope of our review," but that:
[a]s to the methodologies and procedures best suited to the
cases cited supra note 74.
77. Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d 255; Heckman v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 129, 214
Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (1985); A.L.I., supra note 46, at 7, 63.
78. E.g., Medford Trust Co., 292 Mass. 1, 197 N.E. 649, 655; Casey v. Woodruff, 49
N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (Shientag, J.) (court noted that directors had "studied the
problems of" their enterprise before absolving them of liability). Other authorities are col-
lected in A.L.I., supra note 46, at 75.
79. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
80. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
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conduct of the investigation of facts and the determination of
legal liability, the courts are well equipped by long and con-
tinuing experience and practice to make determinations.In
fact they are better qualified in this regard than are corporate
directors in general. Nor do the determinations to be made in
the adoption of procedures partake of the nuances or special
perceptions or comprehensions of business judgment or cor-
porate activities or interests. The question is solely how ap-
propriately to set about to gather the pertinent data."'
Since the holding in Auerbach, the courts have demonstrated
an increasing willingness to examine the procedures and investiga-
tive techniques employed by corporate officials to amass the data
necessary to make informed business decisions. In the most cele-
brated (or calumniated) of these cases, Smith v. Van Gorkom,s2
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board resolution approv-
ing a cash-out merger was improper due to the inadequacy of the
directors' fact-finding procedures. Specifically, the court criticized
the hasty conduct of the meeting at which the merger was ap-
proved, the lack of advance notice or written documentation, the
failure to consider tax implications or to inquire as to the source of
the proposed buy-out figure, and several other factors.8 3 Protests
against the decision have been numerous,84 but since Van Gorkom
there have been several judicial reaffirmations of the requirement
that corporate decision-making be truly "informed. '8 5
2. The A.L.I. Project
Although other commentaries have been cited -in support of
the new judicial emphasis on the requirement of an "informed de-
cision," 86 incomparably the most influential is likely to be the
81. Id. at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
82. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
83. Id. at 874-78.
84. See Manning, supra note 73.
85. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 765 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1985)
(director cannot rely merely on. representations of propriety from interested parties, but
must conduct independent investigation); Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d 264 (inadequate in-
quiry and failure to read reports); In Re Western World Funding, 52 Bankr. 743 (poor state
of corporate records showed that directors could not have been informed); Unocal Corp.,
493 A.2d 946 (possibility of director interest in corporate defense against tender offer shifts
burden to directors to prove reasonable investigation); Moran, 500 A.2d 1346 (investigation
held sufficient).
86. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d at 274 (citing Arsht, supra note 71, and H.
BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 161 (1946)).
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American Law Institute's project entitled "Principles of Corporate
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations," the fourth tentative
draft of which was issued on April 12, 1985.87 A.L.I.'s analysis has
not escaped criticism.88 It is, nonetheless, the product of an institu-
tion and individuals respected enough to make future judicial reli-
ance probable. Indeed, the courts have already begun to cite it.89
Section 4.01(a) 90 of the A.L.I. project would impose upon di-
rectors and officers a standard of due care: "the care that an ordi-
narily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in
a like position and under similar circumstances." Section 4.01(c),
an attempted codification of the Business Judgment Rule, loosens
87. A.L.I., supra note 46.
88. See, e.g., Hinsey, supra note 73; Fishman, Recent Developments in Fiduciary Duty
of Directors and Officers, published in OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY CONTINUING LEGAL EDU-
CATION, DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY (1986).
89. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC, 781 F.2d 264, 274.
90. The full text of § 4.01 is as follows: Duty of Care of Directors and Officers; the
Business Judgment Rule
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions in good
faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation,
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exer-
cise in a like position and under similar circumstances.
(1) This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, such
inquiry as the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under
the circumstances.
(2) In performing any of his functions (including his oversight functions),
a director or officer is entitled to rely on materials and persons in accordance
with §§ 4.02-.03.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corporation [§ 1.27]
and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight, in performing its functions
(including oversight functions), the board may delegate, formally or informally by course of
conduct, any function (including the function of identifying matters requiring the attention
of the board) to committees of the board or to directors, officers, employees, experts, or
other persons; a director may rely on such committees and persons in fulfilling his duty
under this Section with respect to any delegated function if his reliance is in accordance
with §§ 4.02-.03.
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his duty
under this Section if:
(1) he is not interested [§ 1.15*] in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to
the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances;
and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best inter-
est of the corporation.
(d) A person challenging the conduct of a director or officer under this Section has the
burden of proving a breach of duty of care (and the inapplicability of the provisions as to
the fulfillment of duty under Subsection (b) or (c), and the burden of proving that the
breach was the legal cause of damage suffered by the corporation).
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this standard somewhat 9' for a corporate official rendering good
faith business judgments in which he is disinterested, if "he is in-
formed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circum-
stances .. ."9 Thus, an official who wishes to qualify for the re-
laxed standards governing his judgment must first meet what
amounts to a reasonable care level in his data gathering."'
The authors of the A.L.I. project place considerable emphasis
upon the requirement that business judgments be based on ade-
quate information. In a discussion relatively extended for a rather
short publication, they suggest several factors that should be con-
sidered in determining whether a director reasonably believed him-
self to be adequately informed. According to the authors, these fac-
tors include:
(i) the importance of the business judgment to be made; (ii)
the time available for obtaining information; (iii) the costs re-
lated to obtaining information; (iv) the director's confidence
in those who explored a matter and those making presenta-
tions; and (v) the state of the corporation's business at the
time and the nature of competing demands for the board's
attention.9 4
The report continues:
The different backgrounds of the individual directors, the dis-
tinct role each plays in the corporation, and the generalvalue
of maintaining board cohesiveness may all be relevant when
determining whether a director acted "reasonably" in believ-
ing that the information he had before him was "appropriate
under the circumstances.""5
It is worth repeating that the A.L.I. project utilizes the same stan-
dard for measuring the quality of corporate data gathering as for
other corporate decisions outside the scope of the Business Judg-
ment Rule: the standard of reasonable care.9 6
91. A.L.I., supra note 46, at 7, 10-11, 12, 67, 69, and 75.
92. Id. at 7.
93. But cf. Delaware law, in which a gross negligence standard is applied to both data-
gathering and the judgment itself. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858, 873; cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 300 (lack of due preparation a form of negligence).
94. A.L.I., supra note 46, at 66.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 64-65.
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3. Applicability to Property Owners' Associations
One who studies the fact patterns of the recent cases dealing
with informed decision issues may experience an anticlimatic feel-
ing when shifting his attention to property owners association deci-
sion-making. From a real life fantasy land of dashing corporate
raiders tendering multi-million dollar offers and of high-powered
executives devising defense mechanisms that explode on con-
tact-from that ethereal sphere it seems a dizzying descent to a
world of landscape contracting and pet regulation.
Yet the characteristics of property owners associations are
such that the duty to investigate should be at least as great as in
business enterprises of comparable size; perhaps it should be
greater. This does not mean, of course, that associations need em-
ploy New York corporate counsel, hire "big eight" accounting
firms, or commission massive feasibility studies. (Similarly sized
business enterprises are not required to do that either.) It does
mean that association boards should be expected to undertake
some common-sense information-gathering before making impor-
tant corporate decisions.
It has already been noted that negligent association manage-
ment can prove to be more damaging to the average unit owner
than negligent corporate management is to the average share-
holder.9 This fact alone suggests the need for reasonably high
standards. It has likewise been noted that while mismanagement
will reduce the value of all units, including those belonging to asso-
ciation officials, it may also (paradoxically enough) serve to perpet-
uate them in power. Corporate actions that serve to perpetuate ex-
isting management have been held, in business cases, to justify an
"enhanced" degree of scrutiny.18
Moreover, the considerations listed by A.L.I. for determining
whether a decision has an informed basis 9 suggest that association
officials should adhere to a fairly high level of investigation. For
example, the time available for obtaining information may, in a
business context, be limited (thereby reducing the data-gathering
97. See supra text accompanying notes 56-65.
98. In such situations the Delaware courts have applied an "enhanced" degree of scru-
tiny: They have compelled management to carry the burden of proving it acted in an in-
formed manner. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 94 and 95.
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burden imposed) or plentiful (thereby increasing it). a0  Important
association actions are not usually subject to the split-second tim-
ing characteristic of the business world. Except in the most uncom-
mon instance, associations can afford a more leisurely course of
investigation. 01
Additionally, in an association context, the cost of obtaining
necessary information is usually low. If, for instance, the board of
directors is deciding which landscaping firm to employ, the only
significant investigation cost will be the fee for the lawyer (if any)
who evaluates each company's proposed contract and negotiates
the final result. Other data-gathering procedures, such as inter-
viewing company representatives and telephoning references, are
of negligible cost.
Other A.L.I. factors include the "director's confidence in those
who explored a matter and those making presentations" and the
"different backgrounds of individual directors." Each of these
point to a higher standard of investigation for associations than for
most comparably sized businesses. Many, if not most, association
directors are only minimally familiar with business transactions,
and therefore do not possess the rich store of experiences that jus-
tifies the exercise of business intuition. It has generally been ac-
knowledged that inexperienced directors must work harder than
experienced ones to meet the law's required level of care.102 The
development of appropriate investigative procedures can serve to
protect both association managers and the home owners who must
live with their decisions.
During this writer's course of practice, he had the opportunity
to witness numerous association mistakes resulting from inade-
quate fact-gathering procedures. Some of these were (a) signing
overpriced contracts (due to failure to obtain competitive bids), (b)
failing to investigate the background of prospective employees and
100. Cf. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (director liability imposed in part because it had
not been determined that there was a true emergency).
101. As noted in Part III(C), infra, the property owners association is by nature a dif-
ferent creature than the business corporation. The association is not an entrepreneurial en-
terprise; it is a device for property preservation. This helps to explain the greater availabil-
ity of time.
102. Anderson v. Akens, 7 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. Ky. 1934), mod'd sub nom. Atherton v.
Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), mod'd sub nom. Anderson v. Atherton, 302 U.S. 643,
58 S. Ct. 53, 82 L. Ed. 500 (1937). Of course when association directors do have special
skills, the level of care required will be adjusted upward. H. HENN, supra note 3, § 234, at
623.
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contractors, 103 (c) substandard budgeting (due to disregard for past
experience and/or neglecting to obtain professional assistance), 104
(d) promulgating of rules after inadequate investigation, (e) incur-
ring association legal liability and/or locking the association into
disadvantageous contracts (usually due to failure to consult legal
counsel), (f) failing to adequately monitor expenses and assessment
delinquencies, and (g) failing to read and understand insurance
policies.
Professor Fishman has extracted from the recent informed de-
cision cases certain procedural steps helpful in ensuring that busi-
ness directors do not incur liability for deficiencies in information-
gathering. To the extent relevant to associations, these include the
following:
(a) [Plrior notice of important matters to be voted on by the
directors, (b) delivery of written reports to directors, prefera-
bly prior to the meeting, (c) making appropriate officers avail-
able at the meeting to deliver oral reports and answer direc-
tors' questions, (d) directors' spending time making their
decisions, discussing the issues and asking appropriate ques-
tions, (e) directors' review of appropriate original documents
or, at a minimum, having an adequate description of the doc-
uments available for the review of directors, (f) receipt of re-
ports from counsel, accountants, and experts, where appropri-
ate, (g) not making [a] decision in a rushed manner without
seeking to determine whether time limits imposed are neces-
sary, (h) not making major decisions at the initial meeting, if
time is available . . . (j) keeping records of what steps were
taken and the reasons for not taking other steps. 08
In the context of a business corporation, Professor Fishman
notes that "this extensive a list of procedural requirements will not
be necessary to fulfill a director's obligation in approving transac-
103. See Smith, Condos: Ghettos of the 1990's?, 23 DEN. MAG. 44 (1982).
104. In this respect the suggestion of A.L.I., supra note 46, at 60 and 73, that it is
within the Business Judgment Rule not to seek expert advice is misleading. There may be
instances in which such advice can be safely avoided, as when (a) there is an emergency or
(b) there is a danger company trade secrets would be betrayed, but these are, respectively,
(a) hardly ever and (b) never applicable to associations. Actually, a failure to obtain ade-
quate expert review was a significant reason for the decision in Van Gorkom, since general
counsel had been given no advance notice and no valuation study was made. 488 A.2d at
874-78.
105. Fishman, supra note 88, at 33 (material in brackets added); Manning, supra note
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tions less significant than a sale of the entire company."' ° How-
ever, for reasons referred to earlier, property owners associations
should be required to comply with all or most of these procedural
requirements when considering their more important decisions;
and, where major contracts are being pondered, it would be well to
add competitive bidding to the list.10
7
Some specific examples of association decisions and the rela-
tive importance of each might be helpful. Two questions which
certainly qualify for a complete investigative procedure are (a)
whether to hire a professional management company, and (b)
which one to employ. Beyond the obvious importance of this deci-
sion, there is the fact that, once entrenched, an unscrupulous com-
pany can be extremely difficult to dislodge-especially when direc-
tor terms of office are staggered or there are a substantial number
of absentee owners. Employment of a management firm may be
the nearest most associations ever come to a "sale of the entire
company."'' 0 Other important decisions include (c) establishing
broad policies on leasing (i.e., whether it shall be permitted and on
what terms) and (d) occupancy restrictions based on such factors
as age, commercial activity, number of occupants, pets, and family
relationship. (Occupancy rules such as these can affect future
property values substantially.) Of lesser, but still considerable, im-
portance, are such matters as (e) setting an annual budget, (f)
overall maintenance contracting, (g) assessment delinquency poli-
cies, and (h) commencing, waiving, or settling major litigation. 09
A substantial majority of other decisions will require much
106. Fishman, supra note 88, at 33.
107. Competitive bidding is required by numerous state statutes applicable to munici-
palities (to which planned communities are sometimes likened). See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 103 (McKinney 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 312 (Purdon Supp. 1985). Competitive
bidding can sometimes substitute for the multisided argument that helped validate the
board resolution in Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).
108. Planned community documents often set forth a procedure to be followed if the
complex becomes obsolescent, is destroyed, or becomes subject to condemnation proceed-
ings. See, e.g., 1B P. ROHAN, supra note 2, Appendix C-4, at App. -216.39. See also ALI-
ABA, CONDOMINIUM, PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT, AND CONVERSION DOCUMENTS 340-41
(1985). There may also be statutory regulation of the subject. See, e.g., UNI. CONDOMINIUM
AcT § 2-118, 7 U.L.A. 483-85 (1985). Of course decisions made at this point are even more
akin to "sale of an entire company."
109. In the event problems with the developer have arisen (involving construction de-
fects or otherwise), early and thorough consideration of a lawsuit is imperative. This is so
because of the large size of many such claims, the existence of short statutes of limitations,
fading memories, the volatility of developers' financial fortunes, and the possibility that
turnover of units will prejudice warranty claims in states imposing privity requirements.
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less investigation. Some, such as the making of emergency repairs
and small day-to-day equipment purchases, will require almost
none.
C. Should the Standard of Care be Relaxed for Association
"Business Judgments"?
Having applied a reasonable care standard to association ac-
tions generally, and a similar standard to investigation, we must
now consider whether the duty of care should be reduced once the
conditions precedent to the Business Judgment Rule have been
met. In other words, if an association acts in good faith, after rea-
sonable investigation, and in a disinterested manner, may the deci-
sion itself be unreasonable? Put another way: Is the "safe har-
bor" 110 applicable to profit-making enterprises relevant to property
owners associations?
One reason for the Business Judgment Rule is to prevent a
court from substituting its own decision for the judgment of those
with the responsibility to make it. But careful application of a rea-
sonable person standard will adequately serve that purpose. Other
reasons for the Rule arise from the realities of business enterprise:
[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most
imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions. The
circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily
reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business im-
peratives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on
less than perfect information. The entrepreneur's function is
to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a rea-
soned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch
viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
[Additionally], because potential profit often corre-
sponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of
shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly cau-
tious corporate decisions. Some opportunities offer great prof-
its at the risk of very substantial losses, while the alternatives
offer less risk of loss but also less potential profit. Sharehold-
ers can reduce the volatility of risk by diversifying their
holdings.""
110. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
111. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886 (emphasis added). Cf. N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
78. at 273 (1971).
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Even a cursory review of the foregoing quotation will reveal
that the freewheeling standards of the traditional corporate Busi-
ness Judgment Rule have very little relevance to property owners
associations. Such associations are not in existence to engage in en-
trepreneurship. Their function is not to take risks in hope of real-
izing big profits. The association's function is primarily one of
property preservation. The association is expected to protect the
residential complex and (usually) it is to endure at least as long as
the complex does." 2 In this respect it is more akin to a private
trust than to a business corporation. The trustee's prudent inves-
tor rule is a surer guide for the association official than is the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule." 3
Fortunately, those cases which have purported to apply the
Business Judgment Rule to property owners associations have ac-
tually imposed a standard of reasonable care. Thus Schwartzmann
v. Association of Apartment Owners of Bridgehaven'" purported
to rely on Professor Fletcher's truly frightening (frightening, that
is, in this context) statement of the Rule, which, if taken literally,
would absolve even errors "so gross that they may demonstrate the
unfitness of the directors to manage the corporate affairs.""' 5 But
in applying the Rule, the court actually imposes an obligation of
ordinary care." 6 Similarly, in Rywalt v. Writer Corp.," 7 the Rule is
first summarized as merely requiring "good faith" and "an honest
business judgment;" but that summary is immediately followed by
a reference to a requirement that business judgment be "reasona-
ble." 1 8 A comparable process can be discerned in yet another deci-
sion, Papalexiou v. Tower West Condominium."9 In other cases
where courts reviewed association administrative action, the Busi-
112. In some situations longer, as when the complex is destroyed; in other situations it
may be terminated after a period of time, usually 20 years. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF COVE-
NANTS, CONDITIONS, AND RESTRICTIONS, YORKTOWN HOMES (Filed for record, Book 1917, Page
878, Adams County, Colorado) at 893 (twenty years, with provision for automatic renewals).
113. The "prudent investor rule" is essentially a reasonable care standard, with some
emphasis on preservation of principal. G.G. BOGART & G.T. BOGART, supra note 51, at 388-
92; see also RESTATEMENT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 227, 228.
114. 33 Wash. App. 397, 655 P.2d 1177.
115. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 1180.
116. Id. at -, 655 P.2d at 1181. Of course the fact that formulations of the Rule do
not always suggest a lower standard of care assisted these courts in reaching the decisions
they did. See N. LATTIN, supra note 111, § 78, at 273-74; Arscht, supra note 71, at 120-21.
But cf. A.L.I., supra note 46, at 75-76.
117. 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974).
118. Id. at -, 526 P.2d at 317.
119. 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (Ch. Div. 1979).
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ness Judgment Rule was referenced explicitly, but the standard
applied-ordinary care, the rule of reason-has been the same.120
Thus far, therefore, judicial discussion of the Business Judg-
ment Rule in association cases has entailed a great deal of harm-
less error. But the harmlessness of the error should not make one
sanguine, for loose judicial talk can be dangerous. The Rule was
designed to protect the kind of free-wheeling entrepreneurship
which can be a real asset in business. But neither entrepreneurship
nor the Rule's relaxed standards have any place in the government
of a property owners association.1 2 1
D. The Standard of Care and the Business Judgment Rule:
Conclusion
The majority of cases and commentators are correct in favor-
ing the application of a standard of reasonable care to the conduct
of association officials. However, this standard should be imposed,
not quite as it would be in a business enterprise, but with consider-
ation for the fundamental purpose of the property owners associa-
tion: to preserve and ensure the enjoyment of a designated parcel
of real estate. Since an association is not an entrepreneurial enter-
prise, the Business Judgment Rule, insofar as it serves to reduce
the standard of care, cannot be properly applied in reviewing the
conduct of association officials. Since those officials are not subject
to many of the time constraints common in business, and because
their background in such matters is often scanty, they should un-
dertake somewhat more investigation before making decisions than
would be required of competent business directors. It is worth not-
ing that there is now a considerable amount of literature available
to assist them in their deliberations. 122
120. E.g., Schmeck, 441 So. 2d 1092; Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978).
121. It is also inappropriate for reviewing association rule making, an unfortunate sug-
gestion found in Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. REv. 647,
666 (1981). It is worth noting that removing the Business Judgment Rule from the standard
of care applicable to associations would render unnecessary the dual standard adopted by
the court in Frances T., - Cal. 3d -, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) (different
standards of care owed to association member qua member and association member qua
third party).
122. See sources cited supra note 2.
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IV. THE DEVELOPER As FIDUCIARY
A. The Involuntary Trustee
On the whole, the commentators, and some cases, have em-
phasized the fiduciary obligations of planned community develop-
ers to a greater degree than they have emphasized those of associa-
tion officials elected by the property owners.123 It is undeniable
that developers have some duties which, in a loose sense, can be
called "fiduciary." However, as will be seen, those duties are really
identical to more general obligations imposed by tort and contract
law. Duties arising outside of those general obligations-that is,
those which are uniquely fiduciary in nature-do not belong on the
developer's list of duties, despite strenuous efforts by some judges
and many commentators to place them there.
This Part will examine the theories by which the courts have
imposed "fiduciary" liability upon developers. It will also probe the
extent to which those theories are appropriate in determining the
scope of developer duty, and will reach certain conclusions regard-
ing how developer obligations are (or should be) different from
those of other association officials.
123. A good example of this is to be found in the Uniform Condominium Act. The Act
provides that "officers and members of the executive board are required to exercise (i) if
appointed by the declarant, the care required of fiduciaries of the unit owners and (ii) if
elected by the unit owners, ordinary and reasonable care." UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 3-
103(a), 7 U.L.A. 504 (1985). Cf. JNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-103(a), 7 U.L.A.
328 (1985); UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY ACT § 3-103(a), 7B U.L.A. 78 (1985). The practical
effects of this distinction are nowhere explained in the comment. The comment does state
that a "very high standard of duty" is imposed on developer-nominees because "the board is
vested with great power over the property interests of the unit owners, and because there is
a great potential for conflicts of interest between the unit owners and the declarant." The
comment then adds that the lower standard for directors elected by the unit owners is to
"increase the willingness of unit owners to serve." 7 U.L.A. at 505.
Surely the drafters of the Uniform Act could have done better. Are we to conclude that
directors elected by the unit owners are not fiduciaries-that they have no obligations of
loyalty or good faith? Are we to conclude that the primary loyalty of the developer-nomi-
nees is, or should be, to the unit purchasers rather than to their own company? Some of the
implications of the second question are discussed later in this Section.
A good example of a judicial attitude mirroring that of the Uniform Act is found, be-
tween the lines, in Troy v. Village Green Condominium Project, 149 Cal. App. 3d 135, 196
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1983) aff'd sub nom. Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, - Cal. 3d
-, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986) in which the court refused to follow the clearly
applicable precedent of Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334, which had
imposed fiduciary liability for negligence on association directors who were developer-nomi-
nees. The only real difference between Raven's Cove and Troy was that in the latter case
the directors had been elected by the unit owners.
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Three theories have been employed to impose fiduciary obliga-
tions upon development companies and their nominees: (1) the de-
veloper is a corporate promoter (the association being the "corpo-
ration" promoted);124  (2) the developer is a controlling
shareholder;12'5 and (3) the developer's nominees are association di-
rectors and officers. 120 In commencing an evaluation of these theo-
ries it is worthwhile to remember that a real estate developer never
incurs fiduciary liability if he confines his activities to building and
selling traditional, unrelated single-family homes (although he can
incur legal liability on other grounds, of course).127 A few courts
have suggested that inequality of bargaining power may require a
developer to make full disclosure of certain facts'12  and to warrant
the quality of his construction, 29 but few would claim that such
duties are fiduciary in nature. Only builders who undertake to pro-
vide their buyers with the advantages of a planned community are
subject to the risk of fiduciary liability. Given the widely held be-
lief that planned communities better serve the public than do sub-
divisions of unrelated homes, this is an ironic result. 0
This result is more an accident of legal process than a matter
of conscious policy. Long before the first developer/fiduciary duty
case arose, applicable statutes provided that most planned commu-
nities, or at least those with more than a certain number of units,
124. See, e.g., Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 Colo. App. 205, 539 P.2d 1349 (1975); Avila
South Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Shore Terrace
Coop., 25 A.D.2d 666, 268 N.Y.S.2d 278; Mitchell Gardens No. 3 Co-op., 5 Misc. 2d 454, 162
N.Y.S.2d 545.
125. Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Hill Dev. Corp., 36 Conn. Sup. 144,
414 A.2d 1177 (1980); Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89, 458 A.2d 1311 (Ch. Div. 1981),
aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 49, 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983), cert. denied, 94 N.J. 549, 468 A.2d
197 (1983).
126. B & J Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Raven's
Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334.
127. These grounds include breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of
habitability, negligence, and fraud. There is now extensive literature and voluminous case
law on the subject of developer liability. Many of the warranty cases are collected in Rich-
ards v. Powercraft Homes, 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984). A recent article discussing the
topic's relevance to condominiums is Diamond & Raines, Consumer Warranty Issues in the
Sale of Residential Condominiums, 20 REAL PROP., PROB. & T& J. 933 (1985). For a good
discussion of negligence, see Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo.
1983).
128. Jones v. Eagle II, 99 Ill. App. 3d 64, 424 N.E.2d 1253 (1981).
129. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979).
130. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at x; THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON HOUSING 81 (1982).
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had to be governed by property owners associations.' 31 Many also
specified, and still do specify, that the association must be estab-
lished before the first unit sale. An association requires directors
and officers, especially (but not exclusively) if the law requires its
incorporation. 3 2 Since incorporation documents usually must in-
clude the names of the members of an initial board of directors,'33
the developer has had to staff the board as best he
could-generally with his company's principals, employees, associ-
ates, or attorneys. In this writer's experience, persons selected to
serve as nominee-directors have often conceived of their offices as
mere paper positions, assumed merely to accommodate an em-
ployer, business partner, spouse, or client.
When the developer sold his units, he attached association
memberships to them, in compliance with applicable statutes. 34
The builder no doubt thought of himself as selling only real estate,
but the presence of the association, dormant though it might have
been during the sales campaign, rendered matters quite different
in the eyes of most courts. The ordinary housing vendor was now a
"corporate promoter." His firm and its director-nominees had been
transformed into "fiduciaries" by virtue of their "controlling share-
holder" position in the association. Those employees and spouses
who had assumed their directorships to be mere paper positions
found themselves vulnerable to a wide range of liabilities. Their
duties were said to run, not just to their own company and its
shareholders, nor even merely to the association itself, but to pur-
chasers and prospective purchasers as well.13 5 Suddenly the devel-
oper and his associates were no longer mere business people; they
had become virtual trustees.
131, See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1363 (West Supp. 1986) (applies to condominiums and
hybrid communities); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-33-106(5) (condominiums of more than ten
units), 38-33.5-10 (1982) (all cooperative house associations); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.104(3)(h)
(West Supp. 1986) (all condominiums); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49-8B-9(k) (West Supp. 1985) (all
condominiums); VA. CODE § 55-79.73(a) (1981) (all condominiums); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM AcT
§ 3-101, 7 U.L.A. 501 (1980).
132. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.104(3)(h), 718.111(1)(a) (West Supp. 1986); GA.
CODE ANN. § 85-1603e(2) (Harrison Supp. 1985).
133. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.013(2)(g), (h) (West 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 15A: 2-
8(a)(9) (West 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2402(6) (1984). Some condominium statutes
provide that instead of forming an association at the time the property is dedicated to con-
dominium ownership, the developer shall manage the complex directly. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. § 318(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
134. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.111(1)(a) (West Supp. 1986); VA. CODE § 55.79.73
(a) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 318.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
135. See, e.g., Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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Viewed in the foregoing manner, these results can seem artifi-
cial and unfair. But to a certain extent they are both necessary and
appropriate. Throughout his sales campaign, a developer collects
property assessments and manages the planned community. As the
custodian of other people's property, it is proper to charge him
with a number of obligations loosely thought of as "fiduciary":
good faith, due care, legal compliance, and proper record-keeping.
Difficulties arose only when courts, state legislatures, and (espe-
cially) commentators, started taking the word "fiduciary" too seri-
ously and/or applying it too thoughtlessly. Such errors can be most
easily identified amid the fallout from the condominium promoter
cases of the 1960's and 1970's.
B. The Promoter Cases: Commentator Abuse of Alleged Devel-
oper "Abuse"
The two seminal cases on the duties of promoters of business
corporations were decided in the early 1900's. Each arose from the
promotion of the same company. In Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 36 Justice Holmes, writing for the
United States Supreme Court, sustained a demurrer by a promoter
who had been sued by his corporation. The corporation sought res-
titution of profits arising from self-dealing between the promoter
and the corporation when the latter was still under promoter con-
trol. The decision is summarized by Professor Henn:
Here the theory was, as expressed by Holmes, J., that any
duty was to the corporation as it then existed and not as it
was contemplated. Since there was full disclosure to all per-
sons having a present interest in the corporation, there could
be no wrong to the corporation. Even if there had been a
technical wrong, it was condoned. If the later shareholders
were defrauded, they could sue in their own behalf.'
The second case, Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting
Co. v. Bigelow, 3 8 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, had a different result. There, a similar demurrer was
overruled. As summarized by Henn:
The Massachusetts court's theory was that the promoter's du-
136. 210 U.S. 206 (1907).
137. H. HENN, supra note 3, § 104, at 241.
138. 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909), aff'd, 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
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ties to the corporation were coextensive with the promotional
plan. Disclosure had to be to the corporation not only as it
existed but as it was contemplated, and the entity could be
looked behind to see if there had been such full disclosure.
Disclosure to all of the existing shareholders, when originally-
authorized shares were reserved as part of the promotional
plan for additional shareholders to whom there was no disclo-
sure, did not constitute full disclosure to the corporation.
Under either the Bigelow or the Lewisohn rules, where all
of the originally intended shareholders have knowledge, the
subsequent issue of shares to uninformed outsiders makes no
difference. The corporation has no cause of action ... "s
It is commonly said that promoters have fiduciary duties inter
sese. Since they are in a position comparable to that of co-partners
or joint adventures, their responsibilities encompass the same
broad scope of duties which partners and joint venturers owe each
other. 140 It is also said that promoters have "fiduciary" duties to
their corporation and to future shareholders. Yet the Lewisohn
and Bigelow cases suggest that any such duties are extremely nar-
row. Over the years, the rule of Lewisohn has been largely aban-
doned for the slightly broader rule of Bigelow,141 but full disclosure
to present and prospective shareholders has generally been held
sufficient to enable promoters to escape "fiduciary" liability to
those shareholders or to the corporation. To be sure, there is a
great deal of judicial discussion of other duties, but nearly always
the deciding factor has been the adequacy of disclosure.4 " Quite
properly, the courts have recognized that a prospective purchaser
who has not yet committed himself, but who has been given ade-
quate information, should make his own decisions without judicial
supervision.
It is probably misleading to refer to the promoter's duty of
139. H. HENN, supra note 3, § 104, at 241-42.
140. Id. at § 104, at 238-39.
141. Id. at § 104, at 243.
142. See, e.g., Bowers v. Rio Grande Inv. Co., 163 Colo. 363, 431 P.2d 478 (1967); Swaf-
ford v. Berry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P.2d 999 (1963); Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136
S.E.2d 569 (1964); see also McCandless v. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (1935), reh'g denied, 296
U.S. 664 (1935) (Cardozo, J.: Effectively repudiating the Lewisohn rule for that of Bigelow).
Sometimes promoter "fiduciary duties" are invoked to punish theft. See, e.g., Bovary v.
H.M. Byllesby & Co., 27 Del. 381, 38 A.2d 808 (1944); May v. State, 240 Miss. 361, 127 So.
2d 423 (1961).
[Vol. 11:421
HeinOnline  -- 11 Vt. L. Rev. 456 1986
Property Owners Associations
disclosure as a "fiduciary" obligation at all. The initial characteri-
zation of the promoter-corporation relationship as "fiduciary" was
apparently a device for holding promoters liable for non-disclosure
or concealment (as opposed to affirmative misrepresentation) that
was not otherwise actionable at common law."" Since then, how-
ever, the law of fraud and misrepresentation has grown so as to
encompass nearly all concealment cases and many nondisclosure
cases; there is rarely a need to posit a "fiduciary" relationship be-
tween the parties.'
Moreover, where the courts have not imposed disclosure du-
ties, such duties have often been mandated by statute. One com-
mentator has wisely suggested that a promoter's obligation of dis-
closure is more nearly akin to the disclosure requirements of
federal securities law than to true fiduciary duty."45 The Illinois
Appellate Court seems to agree: It has held that comparable disclo-
sure requirements in a Chicago city ordinance were not fiduciary in
nature, but had the effect of eliminating any need for fiduciary du-
ties by putting "the developer and prospective purchasers on as
nearly an even footing as possible.""16
The risk one runs when using the word "fiduciary" to describe
the duties owed by promoters to their corporation and to their
subscribers, lies in suggesting that there is a relationship quite dif-
ferent from the one which actually exists. There is an implication
that the law does, or should, impose responsibilities much broader
than those which are, or should be, imposed. Not surprisingly, the
initial classification of promoter's duties as "fiduciary" has resulted
in confusion in property association law, and, as will be seen, the
confusion persists to this day.
After the decisions in Lewisohn and Bigelow, the next major
historical development of interest occurred in the middle and late
1950's. That was a time of extensive litigation between New York
cooperative housing associations and the companies which had cre-
ated them." 7 In the leading association case of the era, Northridge
143. Cf. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 10.4, at 682 (1973).
144. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 550, 551, and illustrative cases
cited infra note 194.
145. Note, Condominium Developer Self-Dealing, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 295, 302. Cf. D.
DOBBS, supra note 143, § 10.4 at 682.
146. Jones v. Eagle II, 99 Ill. App. 3d 64, 424 N.E.2d 1253, 1260.
147. See Note, Federal Assistance in Financing Middle-Income Cooperative Apart-
ments, 68 YALE L.J. 542, 586-88 (1959).
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Cooperative Section No. 1 v. 32nd Avenue Construction Corp.,' s
the New York Court of Appeals acknowledged a parallel between
the promoter/purchaser arrangements in profit corporations and
those in housing cooperatives. In Northridge, the developer had re-
tained ownership of the land upon which the cooperative was situ-
ate, and while in control of the association had caused it to sign a
long-term lease with him. The purchasers claimed the rent was ex-
cessive, but the court found that they had known of the arrange-
ment before purchase and had signed subscription agreements ap-
proving it. The court did make reference to "fiduciary duties" (as
most cases of this nature do), but the fact that it made no inquiry
into the fairness of the lease indicated that it considered the only
real duty to be one of full disclosure.
14 9
The rule applied in Northridge was thus the doctrine of Bige-
low. It did not always work so well for developers. The same year
Northridge was decided, the New York Supreme Court sustained a
complaint brought in similar circumstances by another cooperative
association, where the complaint had alleged that "a substantial
number of plaintiff's present stockholders had entered into sub-
scription agreements for the purchase of common stock of plaintiff,
and had paid for such stock" prior to the complained-of acts.150
Similar results were reached in other cases. 5 '
The New York cooperative cases were followed by the Florida
condominium cases: Four reported decisions date from the late
1960's and early 1970's. In the first of these, Fountainview Associ-
ation, Inc. #4 v. Bell, 52 the district court of appeal considered a
long-term recreation-area lease, a property conveyance, and a long-
term management contract, each entered into between the associa-
tion and its developer while the former was still under control of
the latter. The association had subsequently passed to home-owner
control and was now seeking damages from the developer for what
it alleged were "exorbitant" rental and management fees.
The Fountainview court affirmed dismissal of the association's
claim, reluctantly concluding itself to be bound by Lake Mabel
148. 22 N.Y.2d 514, 161 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1957).
149. Cf. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 191(2)(d) (full disclosure does not preclude
imposition of constructive trust where transaction was not fair and reasonable to beneficiary
of fiduciary relationship).
150. Mitchell Gardens No. 3 Co-op., 5 Misc. 2d at -, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 158.
151. See, e.g., Shore Terrace Coop., 25 A.D. 2d 666, 268 N.Y.S.2d 278.
152. 203 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), aff'd, 214 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
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Dev. Corp. v. Bird,15 a 1930 Florida Supreme Court decision in the
Lewisohn line of authority. Since for Lewisohn purposes, notice to
future shareholders was not relevant, the opinion did not discuss
whether prospective purchasers had been advised of the relation-
ship of which they were complaining.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed per curiam on
the strength of Lake Mabel. Justice Ervin wrote a seething dissent,
however, in which he assailed "secret profits," and suggested that
the prospective purchasers had not in fact been apprised of the
developer's self-dealing. Of course, adoption of the Bigelow, rather
than the Lewisohn, rule would have met this objection, but Justice
Ervin made it clear that he had broader purposes in mind:
From the allegations of the complaints it appears the Re-
spondent directors and officers [i.e., the developer nominees]
at all times occupied a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relation-
ship to the condominium nonprofit corporations or associa-
tions and their members, and as such they were bound to ex-
ercise corporate powers primarily in the interest of the
condominium corporations or associations and not for their
conflicting personal interests.
.. . [E]ven if the chancellor had been correct in believing
the defendants were the sole members of the corporations at
the time of the transactions complained of, the defendants'
duty to prospective members of the particular condominium
corporations was as great as it would be toward existing
members.""
In support of the last statement, Justice Ervin cited Bigelow,
Northridge, and one of Northridge's progeny, 5 " none of which ac-
tually stood for anything of the kind.
In 1968 and 1970, the same district court of appeal which had
decided Fountainview issued opinions in Wechsler v. Goldman'56
and Riviera Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Weinberger;5 and
in 1973, the Florida Supreme Court followed with Point East
153. 99 Fla. 253, 126 So. 356 (1930).
154. 214 So. 2d at 610-11 (material in brackets added).
155. Mitchell Gardens, 5 Misc. 2d 454, 152 N.Y.S.2d 152.
156. 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
157. 231 So. 2d 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
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Management Corp. v. Point East One Condominium Corp., Inc.15 1
In each of these three new cases, similar self-dealing arrangements
were upheld. But in each of them the holding stressed the fact that
the purchasers had, before sale, agreed to the very arrangements
which they later purported to find obnoxious. Thus the Florida
courts continued to reach pro-developer results, but had sidled
away from the extreme position of Lewisohn and Lake Mabel (no
disclosure necessary) to the more reasonable "full disclosure"
stance of Bigelow and Northridge. Not too long after, in fact, the
Florida Supreme Court used the same rule to award victory to a
condominium association.1 69
But the progress from Lewisohn to Bigelow did not seem to
matter to Justice Ervin or to the commentators who lionized him
for the stand he had taken. Fountainview, Wechsler, Riviera, and
Point East were the targets of a firestorm of protest, and this pro-
test acknowledged no distinctions between them. One writer
reached the incredible conclusion that:
[uln most jurisdictions the developer is treated as a fiduciary
acting on behalf of unknown persons who will purchase and
become members of the association. Under this theory any
overreaching could result in voidable sales contracts. How-
ever, as illustrated by the Fountainview, Riviera, and Wechs-
ler decisions, the Florida courts reject the majority posi-
tion. . . . Since the rights of innocent parties did not arise
until closing, developers could use legal gymnastics to gain ex-
orbitant profits. 60
The comment was an inaccurate one, for, as we have seen, pro-
moter duties are pretty much limited to full disclosure, and Florida
was well within the judicial mainstream in adopting this position.
But as misfortune would have it, Justice Ervin quoted this lan-
guage in his dissent in Point East the following year. This second
dissent illustrated even more clearly than the first that Justice Er-
vin was serving some cause beyond that of full disclosure, for there
had been full disclosure in Point East. His target was developer
158. 282 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
159. Avila South Condominium Ass'n, 347 So. 2d 599.
160. Note, Florida Condominiums: Developer Abuses and Securities Law Implications
Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 350, 355 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Florida Condominiums]. The first two sentences of this quotation were taken almost
verbatim from another commentator, writing one year earlier. Note, Real Property-Geor-
gia's Apartment Ownership Act-Its Scope Analyzed in View of Emergency Condominium
Litigation in Other Jurisdictions, 23 MERCER L. REV. 405, 411 (1972).
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profits, whether or not disclosed: those "excessive overreaching ex-
tractions mulched [sic] from the unit owners."' 61
Point East was decided in 1973. Over the next three years, the
progression of law review articles assailing Florida courts contin-
ued. 16 2 Each castigated the holdings in Fountainview, Wechsler,
Riviera, and Point East, and each demanded statutory and judicial
reform. There was little, if any, acknowledgement that the "self-
dealing" in Wechsler, Riviera, and Point East had been accepted
by the purchasers, after full disclosure, as part of the bargain; nor
was there any investigation of whether the purchase prices would
have been higher without such arrangements.
The circumstances of Wechsler provide a good illustration of
just how far purchasers in these cases were from being victimized.
The self-dealing complained of involved a 99-year recreation lease
to which each buyer agreed, in writing, at the time of purchase.
Agreement to the lease was not a condition of sale, and one buyer
refused to sign it, yet received his unit anyway. Another buyer who
objected to the lease was offered an opportunity to rescind his con-
tract and receive a full refund on his deposit. The trial court had
found that no buyer was bullied, threatened, or harassed in any
way; that all relevant documents had been made available; that all
buyers were vigorous, of mature age, and had had experience in
business and other worldly affairs; and that many were represented
by legal counsel; and that the developer's form contracts could be,
and were, effectively negotiated and altered both before and after
signing.163
One commentator criticizing Wechsler nevertheless suggested
additional disclosure laws, stating that "[e]ven if the prospective
purchaser reads the documentation, he frequently lacks the exper-
tise necessary to assess the reasonableness of the reported costs
and estimates of future costs, and is often unwilling to pay for
expert advice.' 64 Of course, "expert advice" in this context usu-
ally means legal counsel. Why the public or developer should bear
the cost of some people's unwillingness to obtain legal counsel is
not clear, especially since no condominium documents can be made
fully intelligible to the layperson, however many "disclosure no-
161. 282 So. 2d at 62. "Mulched" probably should be "mulcted."
162. See, e.g., articles cited infra note 166.
163. Wechsler, 214 So. 2d at 742-43.
164. Note, supra note 145, at 302 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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tices" there may be. On the contrary, such notices are likely to
mislead potential purchasers into believing that they can safely
proceed without counsel, even though real estate acquisition with-
out a lawyer's advice is almost always a dangerous procedure.'
The real subject of the scholarly criticism was the same target
Justice Ervin had selected: not secret profits, but profits alone.166
With some exceptions, writers suggested imposing fiduciary duties
upon developers to cure the profit "problem," and they occasion-
ally referenced cases in which this had been done.1 67 To these writ-
ers, in other words, the doctrine of fiduciary duty was a mechanism
to serve their personal redistributionist goals.16 8
165. The author has recorded a few of his experiences with unrepresented buyers in
Natelson, Legal Counsel Vital in Real Estate Sale, Denver Post, Dec. 6, 1981, § 6 at 12.
Litigation abounds in states such as Colorado, which allow real estate brokers to draft legal
documents, and in which the use of attorneys is relatively rare. See, e.g., Lester v. Marshall,
143 Colo. 189, 352 P.2d 786 (1960). Such abuses have led states such as New York to se-
verely limit the legal drafting roles of non-attorneys, resulting in extensive use of attorneys
and (in the author's experience) less post-settlement litigation. See, e.g., Duncan & Hill
Realty, Inc. v. Department of State, 62 A.D.2d 690, 405 N.Y.S.2d 339 (1978), appeal denied,
45 N.Y.2d 821, 381 N.E.2d 608, 409 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1978). It is submitted that public policy
should be directed toward (1) encouraging consumers to take the steps necessary to protect
their own interests, and (2) reducing the possibility of future litigation.
166. See supra notes 160 and 161 and accompanying text. See also Hyatt & Rhoads,
Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium and Home
Owners Association, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 973-75 (1976) (quoting Justice Ervin with
approval); Note, supra note 145, at 305 ("exorbitant profits"); Note, Developer Abuses Re-
lating to Condominiums-A Need for Change in Tennessee, 5 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 572, 577
(1975) ("[a] less legitimate reason might be . . .large long-term profits") [hereinafter Devel-
oper Abuses]; Comment, Areas of Dispute in Condominium Law, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV.,
979, 982 (1976) ("high profits" and "unconscionable contracts").
167. E.g., Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 166, at 973-75; Note, Developer Abuses, supra
note 166, at 578 (to his credit, the Memphis writer counsels against the fiduciary duty ap-
proach. Id. at 583); Comment, supra note 166, at 983.
168. Other than generalizations about high consumer demand, most of the commenta-
tors criticizing the quartet of Florida condominium promotion cases had little to say about
specific facts impelling them to conclude that developer profits were excessive. Regarding
these (and many other) charges of "exorbitant profits," several points need to be made.
First, while it is true that at some times and in some places demand for housing is high,
at other times and in other places the reverse is true (in the absence, of course, of artificial
restrictions on supply due to governmental measures such as rent control). Thus law made
based on the assumption of a permanent housing shortage is usually law which is very
shortly out-of-date.
Second, purchasers who voluntarily decide to enter an overheated housing market fre-
quently do so as speculators themselves, hoping to "make a killing" (by selling or refinanc-
ing) when prices rise even higher. Hence their motives are frequently indistinguishable from
those of developers.
Third, even the hottest real estate markets (one might say especially the hottest real
estate markets) are characterized by extensive competition among suppliers. Buyers may
not be able to haggle down prices in such markets, but their choice of sellers (and therefore
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The furor provoked by Fountainview, Wechsler, Riviera, and
Point East ultimately receded. One reason was that Congress and
several of the states passed legislation limiting developer self-deal-
ing, whether or not disclosed and whether or not unconscionable; 169
another was that the Zeitgeist of the 1960's and 1970's finally
passed away. Since that time, most courts dealing with promotion
of planned communities have limited themselves to protecting pur-
chasers from promoter fraud and mismanagement. 17 0  Still, re-
ported cases remain on the books which describe promoter duties
in a manner suggesting that they are broader than they really
are.' 7 ' These cases should be utilized with caution; and the articles
their choice of other features) is a wide one. Justice Ervin's suggestion that the agreements
in Point East were "what amount to adhesion contracts") (282 So. 2d at 632) is, at bottom,
untrue, since the large number of sellers enabled any purchaser who did not like these "ad-
hesion contracts" to take his business elsewhere. (Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 94 (1960) (limited number of suppliers all using the same
warranty form).
Fourth, the "exorbitant profits" of Florida condominium builders in the late 1960's and
1970's must be considered in light of the fact that they were paying some of the highest
construction loan rates in recent history and were also paying high land costs. Additionally,
most builders had probably never seen such profits before, and probably would never see
them again, and the fluctuating nature of the real estate market generally ensures that "ex-
orbitant profits" in good years will be offset by losses or small profits in lean years.
Fifth, data that seem shocking when considered in isolation are often less so in context.
While 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. at 297, n.18 quotes the Florida attorney general to the effect that
"developers investing as little as $2 million in recreational facilities typically reap uncon-
scionable profits of between $3 million and $6 million annually," Note, supra note 145, at
297, n. 18 (emphasis in the original), we are not informed (1) what the value of the land
would have been for other uses, (2) the effect (if any) of leases in lowering the sales price of
units, (3) the advantages (if any) to the purchasers of, in effect, financing part of their
purchase price, (4) the advantages (if any) resulting from the developer bearing some of the
potential tort liability arising out of the use of the facilities, and (5) why (assuming proper
disclosure) the (generally sophisticated) purchasers of Florida condominiums freely agreed
to these kinds of arrangements.
169. See, e.g., Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §3
3601-16 (permitting rescission of any management contract or portion thereof entered into
after October 8, 1980 between the developer and a developer-controlled association, and of
certain leases entered into with the developer). Some states have limited the period during
which a developer can be in control of an association. Virginia is one of these. VA. CODE §
55.79.74(a) (Supp. 1985) (two years for most condominiums unless developer sells 75% of
units sooner). Florida and New Jersey are others. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.301 (West Supp.
1986) (gradual transfer of control as developer sells units); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-12.1
(West Supp. 1986) (same). For additional remedial legislation, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
718.302 (West Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-12.2 (West Supp. 1986).
170. E.g., Ireland v. Wynkoop, 36 Colo. App. 205, 539 P.2d 1349; Avila South Condo-
minium Ass'n, 347 So. 2d 599; Jones v. Eagle II, 99 Ill. App. 3d 64, 424 N.E.2d 1253.
171. E.g., Raven's Cove, 141 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (citing Hyatt &
Rhoads, supra note 166 and Note, Florida Condominiums, supra note 160); see also John-
son v. Nationwide Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 948, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (implying that pro-
moter's "fiduciary duty" should be applied to third party to transaction).
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and commentaries that spawned them should b retained only as
museum pieces, reflective of the times in which they were
written.172
C. Fiduciary Duty and the Construction Defects Cases
It has already been noted173 that there is no conceptual or
practical problem in imposing upon a developer in control of an
operating association certain obligations which can be loosely char-
acterized as "fiduciary." Certainly, a person who has purchased a
unit in a complex during the period of builder control should be
able to expect that the complex will be competently managed, that
there will be a due regard for corporate formalities, that income
and expenses will be carefully accounted for and properly utilized,
and that the owners of all units (including the developer) will com-
ply with the terms of the community's organizational documents
and with applicable law. One can avoid the term fiduciary when
referring to these duties because each can be grounded in the con-
tractual relations of the parties 74 and in more ordinary obligations
of due care.1 75
The majority of courts imposing "fiduciary" liability on con-
trolling developers have done so in appropriate fact patterns. In
most of these cases, the builder has dominated the association for
an extended time, but has mismanaged it sorely. It is difficult, for
example, to sympathize with a developer who collected assess-
ments for years, yet left the association wholly without reserves for
capital replacement;1 76 or whose nominees never attended a board
meeting, but gave oral proxies to their resident manager instead. 177
It is equally difficult to sympathize with a builder who failed to
collect assessments from delinquent owners,178 or to pay them him-
172. One might add, with the great Trajan: "Nam et pessimi exempli, nec nostri saeculi
est." Pliny, Epp., 10.97.
173. Part IV(A) supra, last paragraph in text.
174. The organizational documents of planned communities are considered as, inter
alia, contractual in nature. See, e.g., Unit Owners of Buildamerica v. Gillman, 223 Va. 752,
-, 292 S.E.2d 378, 385 (1982); Candib v. Carver, 344 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977); Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 351 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). The duty of good faith, for example, can be read into the developer's contrac-
tual obligations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 298, 299, 300 (1981).
176. See, e.g., Raven's Cove, 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334.
177. See, e.g., Hillcrest Condominium Ass'n v. Heftler Construction Co., Civil Action
No. 79 CV 1601, slip op. (Adams County, Colorado).
178. Id.
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self; 79 who did not maintain adequate corporate records; 80 who
plundered the association treasury;1 81 who ignored the rules he
himself had issued; i8 2 or who caused the association to execute im-
provident agreements in exchange for secret kickbacks.8 3 In each
instance the developer breached some contractual duty, some obli-
gation of good faith or of due care, or some obligation of the gen-
eral corporate law.
Unfortunately, the imposition of "fiduciary" duties upon de-
velopers in such instances has encouraged some writers to go fur-
ther. Specifically, there has been a tendency to think of the devel-
oper's obligations as including the responsibility most distinctively
fiduciary in nature: the duty of loyalty. As has already been wit-
nessed, the language in some cases and the positions of some com-
mentators 184 imply that developers ought to fully disclose their
profits, be guided by obligations of trust rather than by considera-
tions of profit in selecting construction methods, avoid "excessive"
profit, and wholly refrain from self-dealing.1 85
The problems inherent in attempting to impose the full range
of fiduciary obligations upon developers are exemplified by the
construction defects cases. In each of these cases, property owners
associations sued developers (or their nominees) on the theory that
the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties to the associa-
tion and/or its members by (a) building units and common proper-
ties with construction defects, or (b) failing to repair those defects,
or (c) concealing them. Of course, purchasers of residential real es-
tate have other remedies for deficiencies in construction, including
remedies for fraud, negligence, and breach of implied and express
179. B & J Holding Corp., 353 So. 2d 141.
180. Fitzgerald v. LaFrenier, 68 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. App. 1983).
181. Alleged in Hillcrest, Civil Action No. 79 CV 1601, slip op.
182. St. Francis Courts v. Investors Real Estate, 104 Ill. App. 3d 663, 432 N.E.2d 1274,
1277 (1982).
183. Note, Developer Abuses, supra note 166, at 573.
184. See supra Part IV(B).
185. Presumably, the duty of loyalty would include the usual obligation not to compete
with the beneficiaries of the fiduciary obligation or to act for persons whose interests conflict
with theirs. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 393, 394. One can envision an
owner suing his developer on the ground that the developer's subsequent activities (building
more units in the locality) were inconsistent with these duties since they might diminish the
value of the plaintiff's unit by increasing the available supply! Certainly the language em-
ployed by the cases and commentators referred to above is broad enough to support a de-
mand that the developer's profits from such a "breach of faith" be disgorged. But cf. RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 199, comment a (whether a fiduciary is improperly competing
with his beneficiary depends on the nature of the fiduciary relation).
19861
HeinOnline  -- 11 Vt. L. Rev. 465 1986
Vermont Law Review
warranties. Yet in the 1970's and early 1980's, clqims for breach of
fiduciary duty seemed to afford plaintiffs certain advantages over
other available theories. 18 6 Breach of fiduciary duty may be easier
to prove than fraud, for example. Moreover, in jurisdictions limit-
ing warranty claims to purchasers in privity with the developer,
fiduciary duty seemed a viable alternative where one or more of
the plaintiffs was a remote purchaser. In some states, associations
as entities had been denied standing to sue for construction defects
if, as is true in condominiums, title to common property was vested
in the unit owners rather than in the associations themselves.
The crucial advantage of breach of fiduciary duty as a con-
struction defect claim, however, was that it opened up the possibil-
ity of recovering any "unjust enrichment" (meaning increased
profit) that the developer had received as a result of cutting cor-
ners on workmanship and materials. It was this factor which made
the fiduciary duty theory particularly attractive; for without it, al-
legations of fiduciary breach were largely redundant of other
claims.
The most promising way to obtain restitution of "unjust en-
richment," however, was to allege violation of some aspect of the
duty of loyalty.1 87 It is here that the conceptual quandary arises,
for the conflict between developer and unit purchaser is inherent.
If the developer is to honor his obligations of loyalty to his own
shareholders, he should spend no more on labor and materials than
is required to meet applicable contractual, tort, and warranty stan-
dards. On the other hand, a duty of loyalty to prospective purchas-
ers would seem to necessitate adherence to much higher standards
of construction quality, irrespective of whether those standards are
economically practicable for the builder. Of course, one might con-
tend that it is often more profitable in the long run to utilize top-
quality materials and highly skilled craftsmen, but most business-
men know that such is not always true-that some compromises
(even some risks) are necessary if housing is to be attractively
186. Additional discussion on the scope of theories of developer liability appears in
Natelson, supra note 58. See also Diamond & Raines, supra note 127; Hyatt & Rhoads,
supra note 166.
187. Among the grounds for granting restitution against a fiduciary, breach of the duty
of loyalty is probably the most important, at least in this context. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 403. Other grounds are set forth in id., § 399, comment on clause (d). These
closely parallel violation of the duty of loyalty. Several, such as improper use of a trade
secret, are not germane to property owners associations. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 143,
§ 10.4, at 684-85; see also H. HENN, supra note 3, § 236, at 628-29.
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priced.188 This quandary serves as an excellent example of why fi-
duciary obligations of loyalty have no place in a relationship which
may look fiduciary as a matter of form, but is adverse as a matter
of substance.
Similar difficulties arise when the association alleges, not
merely the existence of construction defects, but that the devel-
oper breached a fiduciary duty by failing to correct them. Natu-
rally, in lawsuits of this kind plaintiffs' counsel are not com-
plaining because the controlling developer failed to spend
association funds to effect repairs. They are complaining because
the developer failed to spend his funds to make repairs. Yet not all
conditions necessitating repair are caused by faulty construction.
The question of whether the builder should bear the full cost of
correcting a problem can be a close one. If the law is that the de-
veloper owes loyalty to two masters, then it unfairly subjects him
to risk that he will be liable to either (or both) if he does not guess
correctly.
For a time it looked as if the courts would extend developer
fiduciary liability to include construction defects. Certainly that
would have been consistent with some of the sweeping language of
cases and commentaries in the 1970's and early 1980's. For exam-
ple, in Avila South Condominium Association, Inc. v. Kappa
Corp.,1 ' 9 decided early in 1977, the Florida Supreme Court had
laid down the following dictum:
We now reaffirm our decision in News-Journal Corporation v.
Gore,. . . and hold that any officer or director of a condomin-
ium association who has contracted on behalf of the associa-
tion with himself, or with another corporation in which he is,
188. It is hoped that the reader will not construe the text as an apologia for shoddy
construction. The point here is that there is a difference between ordinary, workmanlike
construction of the quality appropriate in most circumstances, and the kind of construction
which might be expected of a fiduciary. An example may be found on the floor, so to speak.
Absent contrary contract specifications, the circumstances might permit a developer to in-
stall plywood floors and finish them over with carpet. Plywood flooring of the proper thick-
ness is safe and economical. Yet a developer held to fiduciary standards might be expected
to install hardwood floors, knowing that they are aesthetically more pleasing to many people
than are carpets, and they may improve the value of a unit on resale. The problem is that
they are much more expensive than plywood, and as a result, have almost disappeared in
moderately priced housing in many areas of the country.
Certainly a purchaser desiring hardwood floors wants an amenity far enough above the
norm to expect to pay for it. It should not be the subject of a priori legal theories such as
fiduciary duty.
189. 347 So. 2d 599.
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or becomes substantially interested, or with another for his
personal benefit may be liable to the association for that
amount by which he was unjustly enriched as a result of his
contract. 190
Because associations under developer control generally contract
(expressly or impliedly) for repair and maintenance work with the
developer himself or with related companies, this statement appar-
ently is broad enough to include fiduciary liability for at least some
kinds of construction problems.
The next reported case on the subject arose in 1980, when a
Connecticut trial judge decided Governors Grove Condominium
Association, Inc. v. Hill Development Corp."" Rather surprisingly,
the broad language in Avila was not discussed in the reported deci-
sion, nor was Avila even cited as authority. Instead of alleging that
the construction deficiencies themselves, or a failure to repair
them, constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, plaintiffs' complaint
contended that the developer had breached his fiduciary obliga-
tions by "concealing roof defects from the association and the unit
owners in furtherance of [a] combination and conspiracy ... .
When the developer moved for dismissal on the basis that the
plaintiff had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted,
the court denied its motion. Governors Grove was only a trial court
opinion which happened to be reported, but the following year it
was cited with approval by a New Jersey court in an opinion subse-
quently affirmed on appeal. 93 Thus a new path to construction lia-
bility had been blazed, one which could not go unnoticed by com-
petent plaintiffs' counsel.
Although concealment of known construction defects can be
characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty, it can also be charac-
terized as fraud.1 94 The only advantage to the former theory is the
potential for a judgment of restitution if the money the developer
saved by its concealment exceeded the damages suffered by the
190. Id. at 607.
191. 36 Conn. Super. 144, 414 A.2d 1177.
192. Id. at __, 414 A.2d at 1183.
193. Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 89, 458 A.2d 1311, 1316 (1981),
aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 49, 458 A.2d 1289 (App. Div. 1983), cert. denied, 94 N.J. 549, 468 A.2d
197 (1983).
194. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, - Idaho -, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 and illustration 9) (non-disclosure); Reynolds v. Wilson, 121 Ga.
App. 153, 173 S.E.2d 256 (1970); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (fraudu-
lent concealment).
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plaintiffs. But, again, restitution generally requires a breach of a
duty of loyalty, and imposition of a duty of loyalty would unfairly
subject the developer to the multiple risks discussed above.195
Another disadvantage of imposing fiduciary liability for con-
struction defects is that, for no good reason (and contrary to policy
considerations in favor of encouraging planned communities), it es-
tablishes two different standards of recovery for purchasers of de-
fective residential property. If a purchaser buys a house in an area
not subject to an association and successfully sues for construction
defects, his measure of recovery will probably be expectancy dam-
ages-more likely than not grounded upon a warranty (i.e., con-
tract) theory."" If the house happens to be part of an association
regime, his measure will be expectancy damages or restitution of
profits (whichever is greater)-and, since breach of fiduciary duty
is a tort theory, perhaps punitive damages as well. The difference
in the substance of the transaction (i.e., whether the builder
formed a homeowners association) hardly seems a rational basis for
such a distinction.
Fortunately, it appears the corner has been turned on this is-
sue. In Olympian West Condominium Association, Inc. v.
Kramer,19 7 decided by a Florida appeals court in 1983, the associa-
tion sued the principals of the corporate developer/builder, who
had also served as directors of plaintiff prior to assumption of con-
trol by the homeowners. The plaintiff's theory was that the de-
fendants had breached their fiduciary duty because of construction
defects and their failure to correct same.
While the opinion of the court is extremely terse, it appears
that the association relied upon Avila, whose wording, as noted
above, would appear to be broad enough to sustain their cause. Yet
the court upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the claim, holding
that "no cognizable breach of a common law, statutory, or contrac-
tual duty is alleged."' 8 In an opinion just as terse, the same court
employed Olympian West to dismiss a similar case the following
195. See supra text accompanying note 187.
196. Cost to repair plus consequential losses would appear to be the usual measure of
recovery in such cases, although diminution in market value is also used under certain cir-
cumstances. See, e.g., Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); D. DoBBs,
supra note 143, § 12.21, at 897-907 (1973). For expectancy damages in a common property
context, see Natelson, supra, note 58.
197. 427 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
198. Id.
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year. 19 9
The Florida tribunal that decided Olympian West is perhaps
the nation's most experienced appellate court in the realm of asso-
ciation law, so it is improbable that its opinion was short merely
because it had nothing to say. The judges no doubt spoke as they
did because (1) they now realize the theoretical and practical
problems inherent in imposing the duty of loyalty in such circum-
stances, but (2) they are bound not to attack directly the pro-
nouncements on fiduciary duty made by higher authority, specifi-
cally the pronouncements of the Florida Supreme Court in Avila
and of the Florida Legislature in its statutory imposition .of fiduci-
ary duties upon condominium developers. 20
0
CONCLUSION: DEVELOPER FIDUCIARY DUTY
There is no conceptual or practical problem in requiring that a
developer and his nominees in control of an operating association
meet the same standard of care imposed upon officials chosen by
owners. Those standards were discussed earlier in this article.2"'
However, the courts and state legislatures would do well to ac-
knowledge that the developer and his nominees are simply not fi-
duciaries in the full and traditional sense of the word. For by now
it should be clear that it is inappropriate to impose an obligation
of loyalty running from the developer to the association or to his
purchasers. The developer is not a trustee who has agreed to un-
dertake duties of loyalty toward beneficiaries entrusted to his care.
Nor is he the guardian of an incompetent, an attorney acting for a
client, or (with respect to his purchasers) even a business executive
leading a common enterprise. He is a "fiduciary" only because in a
planned community an association happens to be appurtenant to
the land. His position is the result of a fluke in the law and of
excessive emphasis on form.
The substance of the matter is that developers and purchasers
stand in inherently adverse positions. The purchaser wants the
best deal he can get; the developer is interested in the highest pos-
199. Lakeview Townhomes Condominiums Ass'n, Inc. v. East Florida Dev. Corp., 454
So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
200. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.111(a) (West Supp. 1986). Similar statutory provisions are
found at VA. CODE § 55.79-74(a) (Supp. 1985) and ILL. ANN. STAT., tit. 30, § 318.4 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1986).
201. See generally supra Parts II and III.
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sible profit. Certainly most purchasers recognize this, even if some
courts and commentators do not. In the majority of residential real
estate transactions there is enough opportunity for negotiation,
and dealings are sufficiently at arms-length, to dispel any inference
that the developer is acting as the purchaser's "trustee. '20 2 Other
than the planned community developer's responsibility of manag-
ing the association during the sales campaign, most purchasers see
no difference between him and any other home vendor; and they
are correct, for there is none.
To the extent that a policy of the law is to further the legiti-
mate expectations of the parties, the courts and the legislatures
should protect the purchasers' expectations that the developer will
not cheat them, that he will disclose material facts, that he will not
violate the duties imposed by ordinary contract and tort law, and
that he will comply with corporate formalities in administering the
association while it is under his control. But obligations of loyalty
do not belong on the list. However tempting the circumstances of
an individual case, one should not pretend that they do.
202. This observation was made in a somewhat different form by the court in Jones v.
Eagle II, 99 Ill. App. 3d 64, 424 N.E.2d 1253, 1260. It is well borne out by this author's
experience in law practice, much of it acquired in representing parties to residential real
estate transactions. (This experience was acquired in widely separated parts of the country.)
Note, however, that this is not to say that developers and purchasers negotiate on equal
terms with respect to all aspects of all residential real estate transactions. Although most
buyers do not think of builders as their fiduciaries (i.e., have no expectations in that regard),
sometimes they do have reasonable expectations which ought not be defeated by undickered
terms in fine-print form contracts. For example, the purchaser has a reasonable expectation
that his home will be built in a workmanlike manner; that expectation ought not to be
defeated by a warranty disclaimer in an inconspicuous part of the builder's form. Numerous
cases have so held, but the reader is cautioned against taking some of the wording of those
cases too seriously. All too often that wording is based upon pseudohistory, and/or a lack of
understanding of the mechanisms of housing sales. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (1965) ("caveat emptor developed when the buyer and seller
were in an equal bargaining position. . . .Buyers of mass-produced homes are not on an
equal footing with the builder vendors and are no more able to protect themselves. . . than
are automobile purchasers.") Schipper was rightly decided, but the quoted language is
largely erroneous as a matter of fact. Yet, like overbroad use of the fiduciary duty doctrine,
the notions this language reflects have crept into many other cases. See, e.g., McDonald v.
Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283, 1289 (1979); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, - Idaho at
- 415 P.2d at 709, Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 3d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr.
749, 753 (1969). Surely there is a difference between saying that purchasers cannot protect
themselves against certain practices (as a matter of fact, they can), and saying that the law
ought not to impose upon them the burden of doing so.
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